Mining/pkg/ueps/reader.go

package ueps

import (
	"bufio"
	"bytes"
	"crypto/hmac"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/binary"
	"io"
)

// packet, err := ReadAndVerify(r, secret)
// if errors.Is(err, errMissingHMAC) { /* no HMAC tag found in frame */ }
var errMissingHMAC = tlvError("UEPS packet missing HMAC signature")

// packet, err := ReadAndVerify(r, wrongSecret)
// if errors.Is(err, errIntegrityViolation) { /* HMAC mismatch — threat score incremented */ }
var errIntegrityViolation = tlvError("integrity violation: HMAC mismatch (ThreatScore +100)")

// packet, err := ueps.ReadAndVerify(r, sharedSecret)
// if err == nil { _ = packet.Header.IntentID; _ = packet.Header.ThreatScore; _ = packet.Payload }
type ParsedPacket struct {
	Header  UEPSHeader
	Payload []byte
}

// packet, err := ueps.ReadAndVerify(bufio.NewReader(conn), []byte("my-shared-secret"))
// if err != nil { /* integrity violation or truncated frame */ }
func ReadAndVerify(reader *bufio.Reader, sharedSecret []byte) (*ParsedPacket, error) {
	// Buffer to reconstruct the data for HMAC verification
	// We have to "record" what we read to verify the signature later.
	var signedData bytes.Buffer
	header := UEPSHeader{}
	var signature []byte
	var payload []byte

	// Loop through TLVs until we hit Payload (0xFF) or EOF
	for {
		// 1. Read Tag
		tag, err := reader.ReadByte()
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}

		// 2. Handle Payload Tag (0xFF) - The Exit Condition
		if tag == TagPayload {
			// Payload is length-prefixless; caller frames the stream.
			// HMAC covers signedData (header TLVs) + raw payload bytes, not the 0xFF tag.
			remaining, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
			if err != nil {
				return nil, err
			}
			payload = remaining
			break
		}

		// 3. Read Length (Standard TLV)
		lengthByte, err := reader.ReadByte()
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		length := int(lengthByte)

		// 4. Read Value
		value := make([]byte, length)
		if _, err := io.ReadFull(reader, value); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}

		// Store for processing
		switch tag {
		case TagVersion:
			header.Version = value[0]
			// Reconstruct signed data: Tag + Len + Val
			signedData.WriteByte(tag)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(length))
			signedData.Write(value)
		case TagCurrentLayer:
			header.CurrentLayer = value[0]
			signedData.WriteByte(tag)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(length))
			signedData.Write(value)
		case TagTargetLayer:
			header.TargetLayer = value[0]
			signedData.WriteByte(tag)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(length))
			signedData.Write(value)
		case TagIntent:
			header.IntentID = value[0]
			signedData.WriteByte(tag)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(length))
			signedData.Write(value)
		case TagThreatScore:
			header.ThreatScore = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(value)
			signedData.WriteByte(tag)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(length))
			signedData.Write(value)
		case TagHMAC:
			signature = value
			// We do NOT add the HMAC itself to signedData
		default:
			// Unknown tag (future proofing), verify it but ignore semantics
			signedData.WriteByte(tag)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(length))
			signedData.Write(value)
		}
	}

	if len(signature) == 0 {
		return nil, errMissingHMAC
	}

	// 5. Verify HMAC
	// Reconstruct: Headers (signedData) + Payload
	messageAuthCode := hmac.New(sha256.New, sharedSecret)
	messageAuthCode.Write(signedData.Bytes())
	messageAuthCode.Write(payload)
	expectedMAC := messageAuthCode.Sum(nil)

	if !hmac.Equal(signature, expectedMAC) {
		// Log this. This is a Threat Event.
		// "Axiom Violation: Integrity Check Failed"
		return nil, errIntegrityViolation
	}

	return &ParsedPacket{
		Header:  header,
		Payload: payload,
	}, nil
}