Mining/pkg/ueps/reader.go

package ueps

import (
	"bufio"
	"bytes"
	"crypto/hmac"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/binary"
	"io"
)

// packet, err := ReadAndVerify(bufio.NewReader(conn), secret)
// if err == errMissingHMAC { /* no HMAC tag found in frame */ }
var errMissingHMAC = tlvError("UEPS packet missing HMAC signature")

// packet, err := ReadAndVerify(bufio.NewReader(conn), wrongSecret)
// if err == errIntegrityViolation { /* HMAC mismatch — threat score incremented */ }
var errIntegrityViolation = tlvError("integrity violation: HMAC mismatch (ThreatScore +100)")

// packet, err := ueps.ReadAndVerify(bufio.NewReader(conn), sharedSecret)
// if err == nil { _ = packet.Header.IntentID; _ = packet.Header.ThreatScore; _ = packet.Payload }
type ParsedPacket struct {
	Header  UEPSHeader
	Payload []byte
}

// packet, err := ueps.ReadAndVerify(bufio.NewReader(conn), []byte("my-shared-secret"))
// if err == nil { dispatch(packet.Header.IntentID, packet.Header.ThreatScore, packet.Payload) }
func ReadAndVerify(reader *bufio.Reader, sharedSecret []byte) (*ParsedPacket, error) {
	var signedData bytes.Buffer
	header := UEPSHeader{}
	var signature []byte
	var payload []byte

	// Loop through TLVs until we hit Payload (0xFF) or EOF
	for {
		// 1. Read Tag
		tagByte, err := reader.ReadByte()
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}

		// 2. Handle Payload Tag (0xFF) - The Exit Condition
		if tagByte == TagPayload {
			// Payload is length-prefixless; caller frames the stream.
			// HMAC covers signedData (header TLVs) + raw payload bytes, not the 0xFF tag.
			var err error
			payload, err = io.ReadAll(reader)
			if err != nil {
				return nil, err
			}
			break
		}

		// 3. Read Length (Standard TLV)
		tagLengthByte, err := reader.ReadByte()
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		tagLength := int(tagLengthByte)

		// 4. Read Value
		tagValue := make([]byte, tagLength)
		if _, err := io.ReadFull(reader, tagValue); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}

		switch tagByte {
		case TagVersion:
			header.Version = tagValue[0]
			// Reconstruct signed data: Tag + Len + Val
			signedData.WriteByte(tagByte)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(tagLength))
			signedData.Write(tagValue)
		case TagCurrentLayer:
			header.CurrentLayer = tagValue[0]
			signedData.WriteByte(tagByte)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(tagLength))
			signedData.Write(tagValue)
		case TagTargetLayer:
			header.TargetLayer = tagValue[0]
			signedData.WriteByte(tagByte)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(tagLength))
			signedData.Write(tagValue)
		case TagIntent:
			header.IntentID = tagValue[0]
			signedData.WriteByte(tagByte)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(tagLength))
			signedData.Write(tagValue)
		case TagThreatScore:
			header.ThreatScore = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(tagValue)
			signedData.WriteByte(tagByte)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(tagLength))
			signedData.Write(tagValue)
		case TagHMAC:
			signature = tagValue
			// We do NOT add the HMAC itself to signedData
		default:
			// Unknown tag (future proofing), verify it but ignore semantics
			signedData.WriteByte(tagByte)
			signedData.WriteByte(byte(tagLength))
			signedData.Write(tagValue)
		}
	}

	if len(signature) == 0 {
		return nil, errMissingHMAC
	}

	// 5. Verify HMAC
	// Reconstruct: Headers (signedData) + Payload
	messageAuthCode := hmac.New(sha256.New, sharedSecret)
	messageAuthCode.Write(signedData.Bytes())
	messageAuthCode.Write(payload)
	expectedMessageAuthCode := messageAuthCode.Sum(nil)

	if !hmac.Equal(signature, expectedMessageAuthCode) {
		return nil, errIntegrityViolation
	}

	return &ParsedPacket{
		Header:  header,
		Payload: payload,
	}, nil
}