cli/pkg/io/local/client.go

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feat(mcp): add workspace root validation to prevent path traversal (#100) * feat(mcp): add workspace root validation to prevent path traversal - Add workspaceRoot field to Service for restricting file operations - Add WithWorkspaceRoot() option for configuring the workspace directory - Add validatePath() helper to check paths are within workspace - Apply validation to all file operation handlers - Default to current working directory for security - Add comprehensive tests for path validation Closes #82 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: move CLI commands from pkg/ to internal/cmd/ - Move 18 CLI command packages to internal/cmd/ (not externally importable) - Keep 16 library packages in pkg/ (externally importable) - Update all import paths throughout codebase - Cleaner separation between CLI logic and reusable libraries CLI commands moved: ai, ci, dev, docs, doctor, gitcmd, go, monitor, php, pkgcmd, qa, sdk, security, setup, test, updater, vm, workspace Libraries remaining: agentic, build, cache, cli, container, devops, errors, framework, git, i18n, io, log, mcp, process, release, repos Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(mcp): use pkg/io Medium for sandboxed file operations Replace manual path validation with pkg/io.Medium for all file operations. This delegates security (path traversal, symlink bypass) to the sandboxed local.Medium implementation. Changes: - Add io.NewSandboxed() for creating sandboxed Medium instances - Refactor MCP Service to use io.Medium instead of direct os.* calls - Remove validatePath and resolvePathWithSymlinks functions - Update tests to verify Medium-based behaviour Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct import path and workflow references - Fix pkg/io/io.go import from core-gui to core - Update CI workflows to use internal/cmd/updater path Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): address CodeRabbit review issues for path validation - pkg/io/local: add symlink resolution and boundary-aware containment - Reject absolute paths in sandboxed Medium - Use filepath.EvalSymlinks to prevent symlink bypass attacks - Fix prefix check to prevent /tmp/root matching /tmp/root2 - pkg/mcp: fix resolvePath to validate and return errors - Changed resolvePath from (string) to (string, error) - Update deleteFile, renameFile, listDirectory, fileExists to handle errors - Changed New() to return (*Service, error) instead of *Service - Properly propagate option errors instead of silently discarding - pkg/io: wrap errors with E() helper for consistent context - Copy() and MockMedium.Read() now use coreerr.E() - tests: rename to use _Good/_Bad/_Ugly suffixes per coding guidelines - Fix hardcoded /tmp in TestPath to use t.TempDir() - Add TestResolvePath_Bad_SymlinkTraversal test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: fix gofmt formatting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: fix gofmt formatting across all files Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-01 21:59:34 +00:00
// Package local provides a local filesystem implementation of the io.Medium interface.
package local
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
// Medium is a local filesystem storage backend.
type Medium struct {
root string
}
// New creates a new local Medium with the specified root directory.
// The root directory will be created if it doesn't exist.
func New(root string) (*Medium, error) {
// Ensure root is an absolute path
absRoot, err := filepath.Abs(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Create root directory if it doesn't exist
if err := os.MkdirAll(absRoot, 0755); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Medium{root: absRoot}, nil
}
// path sanitizes and joins the relative path with the root directory.
// Returns an error if a path traversal attempt is detected.
// Uses filepath.EvalSymlinks to prevent symlink-based bypass attacks.
func (m *Medium) path(relativePath string) (string, error) {
// Clean the path to remove any .. or . components
cleanPath := filepath.Clean(relativePath)
// Check for path traversal attempts in the raw path
if strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, "..") || strings.Contains(cleanPath, string(filepath.Separator)+"..") {
return "", errors.New("path traversal attempt detected")
}
// Reject absolute paths - they bypass the sandbox
if filepath.IsAbs(cleanPath) {
return "", errors.New("path traversal attempt detected")
}
fullPath := filepath.Join(m.root, cleanPath)
// Verify the resulting path is still within root (boundary-aware check)
// Must use separator to prevent /tmp/root matching /tmp/root2
rootWithSep := m.root
if !strings.HasSuffix(rootWithSep, string(filepath.Separator)) {
rootWithSep += string(filepath.Separator)
}
if fullPath != m.root && !strings.HasPrefix(fullPath, rootWithSep) {
return "", errors.New("path traversal attempt detected")
}
// Resolve symlinks to prevent bypass attacks
// We need to resolve both the root and full path to handle symlinked roots
resolvedRoot, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(m.root)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Build boundary-aware prefix for resolved root
resolvedRootWithSep := resolvedRoot
if !strings.HasSuffix(resolvedRootWithSep, string(filepath.Separator)) {
resolvedRootWithSep += string(filepath.Separator)
}
// For the full path, resolve as much as exists
// Use Lstat first to check if the path exists
if _, err := os.Lstat(fullPath); err == nil {
resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(fullPath)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Verify resolved path is still within resolved root (boundary-aware)
if resolvedPath != resolvedRoot && !strings.HasPrefix(resolvedPath, resolvedRootWithSep) {
return "", errors.New("path traversal attempt detected via symlink")
}
return resolvedPath, nil
}
// Path doesn't exist yet - verify parent directory
parentDir := filepath.Dir(fullPath)
if _, err := os.Lstat(parentDir); err == nil {
resolvedParent, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(parentDir)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if resolvedParent != resolvedRoot && !strings.HasPrefix(resolvedParent, resolvedRootWithSep) {
return "", errors.New("path traversal attempt detected via symlink")
}
}
return fullPath, nil
}
// Read retrieves the content of a file as a string.
func (m *Medium) Read(relativePath string) (string, error) {
fullPath, err := m.path(relativePath)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(fullPath)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(content), nil
}
// Write saves the given content to a file, overwriting it if it exists.
// Parent directories are created automatically.
func (m *Medium) Write(relativePath, content string) error {
fullPath, err := m.path(relativePath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Ensure parent directory exists
parentDir := filepath.Dir(fullPath)
if err := os.MkdirAll(parentDir, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
return os.WriteFile(fullPath, []byte(content), 0644)
}
// EnsureDir makes sure a directory exists, creating it if necessary.
func (m *Medium) EnsureDir(relativePath string) error {
fullPath, err := m.path(relativePath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return os.MkdirAll(fullPath, 0755)
}
// IsFile checks if a path exists and is a regular file.
func (m *Medium) IsFile(relativePath string) bool {
fullPath, err := m.path(relativePath)
if err != nil {
return false
}
info, err := os.Stat(fullPath)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return info.Mode().IsRegular()
}
// FileGet is a convenience function that reads a file from the medium.
func (m *Medium) FileGet(relativePath string) (string, error) {
return m.Read(relativePath)
}
// FileSet is a convenience function that writes a file to the medium.
func (m *Medium) FileSet(relativePath, content string) error {
return m.Write(relativePath, content)
}