package mcp import ( "os" "path/filepath" "testing" ) func TestNew_Good_DefaultWorkspace(t *testing.T) { cwd, err := os.Getwd() if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to get working directory: %v", err) } s, err := New() if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err) } if s.workspaceRoot != cwd { t.Errorf("Expected default workspace root %s, got %s", cwd, s.workspaceRoot) } if s.medium == nil { t.Error("Expected medium to be set") } } func TestNew_Good_CustomWorkspace(t *testing.T) { tmpDir := t.TempDir() s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir)) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err) } if s.workspaceRoot != tmpDir { t.Errorf("Expected workspace root %s, got %s", tmpDir, s.workspaceRoot) } if s.medium == nil { t.Error("Expected medium to be set") } } func TestNew_Good_NoRestriction(t *testing.T) { s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot("")) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err) } if s.workspaceRoot != "" { t.Errorf("Expected empty workspace root, got %s", s.workspaceRoot) } if s.medium == nil { t.Error("Expected medium to be set (unsandboxed)") } } func TestMedium_Good_ReadWrite(t *testing.T) { tmpDir := t.TempDir() s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir)) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err) } // Write a file testContent := "hello world" err = s.medium.Write("test.txt", testContent) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to write file: %v", err) } // Read it back content, err := s.medium.Read("test.txt") if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to read file: %v", err) } if content != testContent { t.Errorf("Expected content %q, got %q", testContent, content) } // Verify file exists on disk diskPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test.txt") if _, err := os.Stat(diskPath); os.IsNotExist(err) { t.Error("File should exist on disk") } } func TestMedium_Good_EnsureDir(t *testing.T) { tmpDir := t.TempDir() s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir)) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err) } err = s.medium.EnsureDir("subdir/nested") if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create directory: %v", err) } // Verify directory exists diskPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir", "nested") info, err := os.Stat(diskPath) if os.IsNotExist(err) { t.Error("Directory should exist on disk") } if err == nil && !info.IsDir() { t.Error("Path should be a directory") } } func TestMedium_Good_IsFile(t *testing.T) { tmpDir := t.TempDir() s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir)) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err) } // File doesn't exist yet if s.medium.IsFile("test.txt") { t.Error("File should not exist yet") } // Create the file _ = s.medium.Write("test.txt", "content") // Now it should exist if !s.medium.IsFile("test.txt") { t.Error("File should exist after write") } } func TestSandboxing_Traversal_Sanitized(t *testing.T) { tmpDir := t.TempDir() s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir)) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err) } // Path traversal is sanitized (.. becomes .), so ../secret.txt becomes // ./secret.txt in the workspace. Since that file doesn't exist, we get // a file not found error (not a traversal error). _, err = s.medium.Read("../secret.txt") if err == nil { t.Error("Expected error (file not found)") } // Absolute paths are allowed through - they access the real filesystem. // This is intentional for full filesystem access. Callers wanting sandboxing // should validate inputs before calling Medium. } func TestSandboxing_Symlinks_Followed(t *testing.T) { tmpDir := t.TempDir() outsideDir := t.TempDir() // Create a target file outside workspace targetFile := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "secret.txt") if err := os.WriteFile(targetFile, []byte("secret"), 0644); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create target file: %v", err) } // Create symlink inside workspace pointing outside symlinkPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "link") if err := os.Symlink(targetFile, symlinkPath); err != nil { t.Skipf("Symlinks not supported: %v", err) } s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir)) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err) } // Symlinks are followed - no traversal blocking at Medium level. // This is intentional for simplicity. Callers wanting to block symlinks // should validate inputs before calling Medium. content, err := s.medium.Read("link") if err != nil { t.Errorf("Expected symlink to be followed, got error: %v", err) } if content != "secret" { t.Errorf("Expected 'secret', got '%s'", content) } }