* feat(io): Migrate pkg/mcp to use Medium abstraction - Replaced custom path validation in `pkg/mcp` with `local.Medium` sandboxing. - Updated `mcp.Service` to use `io.Medium` for all file operations. - Enhanced `local.Medium` security by implementing robust symlink escape detection in `validatePath`. - Simplified `fileExists` handler to use `IsFile` and `IsDir` methods. - Removed redundant Issue 103 comments. - Updated tests to verify symlink blocking. This change ensures consistent path security across the codebase and simplifies the MCP server implementation. * feat(io): Migrate pkg/mcp to use Medium abstraction and enhance security - Replaced custom path validation in `pkg/mcp` with `local.Medium` sandboxing. - Updated `mcp.Service` to use `io.Medium` interface for all file operations. - Enhanced `local.Medium` security by implementing robust symlink escape detection in `validatePath`. - Simplified `fileExists` handler to use `IsFile` and `IsDir` methods. - Removed redundant Issue 103 comments. - Updated tests to verify symlink blocking and type compatibility. This change ensures consistent path security across the codebase and simplifies the MCP server implementation. * feat(io): Migrate pkg/mcp to use Medium abstraction and enhance security - Replaced custom path validation in `pkg/mcp` with `local.Medium` sandboxing. - Updated `mcp.Service` to use `io.Medium` interface for all file operations. - Enhanced `local.Medium` security by implementing robust symlink escape detection in `validatePath`. - Simplified `fileExists` handler to use `IsFile` and `IsDir` methods. - Removed redundant Issue 103 comments. - Updated tests to verify symlink blocking and type compatibility. Confirmed that CI failure `org-gate` is administrative and requires manual label. Local tests pass. * feat(io): Migrate pkg/mcp to use Medium abstraction and enhance security - Replaced custom path validation in `pkg/mcp` with `local.Medium` sandboxing. - Updated `mcp.Service` to use `io.Medium` interface for all file operations. - Enhanced `local.Medium` security by implementing robust symlink escape detection in `validatePath`. - Optimized `fileExists` handler to use a single `Stat` call for improved efficiency. - Cleaned up outdated comments and removed legacy validation logic. - Updated tests to verify symlink blocking and correct sandboxing of absolute paths. This change ensures consistent path security across the codebase and simplifies the MCP server implementation.
217 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
217 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
// Package local provides a local filesystem implementation of the io.Medium interface.
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package local
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import (
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"io/fs"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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)
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// Medium is a local filesystem storage backend.
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type Medium struct {
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root string
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}
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// New creates a new local Medium rooted at the given directory.
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// Pass "/" for full filesystem access, or a specific path to sandbox.
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func New(root string) (*Medium, error) {
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abs, err := filepath.Abs(root)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &Medium{root: abs}, nil
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}
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// path sanitizes and returns the full path.
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// Absolute paths are sandboxed under root (unless root is "/").
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func (m *Medium) path(p string) string {
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if p == "" {
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return m.root
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}
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// Use filepath.Clean with a leading slash to resolve all .. and . internally
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// before joining with the root. This is a standard way to sandbox paths.
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clean := filepath.Clean("/" + p)
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// If root is "/", allow absolute paths through
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if m.root == "/" {
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return clean
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}
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// Join cleaned relative path with root
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return filepath.Join(m.root, clean)
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}
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// validatePath ensures the path is within the sandbox, following symlinks if they exist.
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func (m *Medium) validatePath(p string) (string, error) {
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if m.root == "/" {
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return m.path(p), nil
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}
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// Split the cleaned path into components
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parts := strings.Split(filepath.Clean("/"+p), string(os.PathSeparator))
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current := m.root
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for _, part := range parts {
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if part == "" {
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continue
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}
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next := filepath.Join(current, part)
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realNext, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(next)
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if err != nil {
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if os.IsNotExist(err) {
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// Part doesn't exist, we can't follow symlinks anymore.
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// Since the path is already Cleaned and current is safe,
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// appending a component to current will not escape.
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current = next
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continue
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}
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return "", err
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}
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// Verify the resolved part is still within the root
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rel, err := filepath.Rel(m.root, realNext)
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if err != nil || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") {
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return "", os.ErrPermission // Path escapes sandbox
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}
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current = realNext
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}
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return current, nil
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}
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// Read returns file contents as string.
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func (m *Medium) Read(p string) (string, error) {
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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data, err := os.ReadFile(full)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return string(data), nil
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}
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// Write saves content to file, creating parent directories as needed.
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func (m *Medium) Write(p, content string) error {
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(full), 0755); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return os.WriteFile(full, []byte(content), 0644)
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}
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// EnsureDir creates directory if it doesn't exist.
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func (m *Medium) EnsureDir(p string) error {
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return os.MkdirAll(full, 0755)
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}
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// IsDir returns true if path is a directory.
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func (m *Medium) IsDir(p string) bool {
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if p == "" {
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return false
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}
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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info, err := os.Stat(full)
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return err == nil && info.IsDir()
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}
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// IsFile returns true if path is a regular file.
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func (m *Medium) IsFile(p string) bool {
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if p == "" {
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return false
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}
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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info, err := os.Stat(full)
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return err == nil && info.Mode().IsRegular()
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}
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// Exists returns true if path exists.
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func (m *Medium) Exists(p string) bool {
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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_, err = os.Stat(full)
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return err == nil
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}
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// List returns directory entries.
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func (m *Medium) List(p string) ([]fs.DirEntry, error) {
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return os.ReadDir(full)
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}
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// Stat returns file info.
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func (m *Medium) Stat(p string) (fs.FileInfo, error) {
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return os.Stat(full)
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}
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// Delete removes a file or empty directory.
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func (m *Medium) Delete(p string) error {
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if len(full) < 3 {
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return nil
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}
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return os.Remove(full)
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}
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// DeleteAll removes a file or directory recursively.
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func (m *Medium) DeleteAll(p string) error {
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full, err := m.validatePath(p)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if len(full) < 3 {
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return nil
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}
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return os.RemoveAll(full)
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}
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// Rename moves a file or directory.
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func (m *Medium) Rename(oldPath, newPath string) error {
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oldFull, err := m.validatePath(oldPath)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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newFull, err := m.validatePath(newPath)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return os.Rename(oldFull, newFull)
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}
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// FileGet is an alias for Read.
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func (m *Medium) FileGet(p string) (string, error) {
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return m.Read(p)
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}
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// FileSet is an alias for Write.
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func (m *Medium) FileSet(p, content string) error {
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return m.Write(p, content)
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}
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