cli/pkg/mcp/mcp_test.go
Snider f47e8211fb feat(mcp): add workspace root validation to prevent path traversal (#100)
* feat(mcp): add workspace root validation to prevent path traversal

- Add workspaceRoot field to Service for restricting file operations
- Add WithWorkspaceRoot() option for configuring the workspace directory
- Add validatePath() helper to check paths are within workspace
- Apply validation to all file operation handlers
- Default to current working directory for security
- Add comprehensive tests for path validation

Closes #82

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: move CLI commands from pkg/ to internal/cmd/

- Move 18 CLI command packages to internal/cmd/ (not externally importable)
- Keep 16 library packages in pkg/ (externally importable)
- Update all import paths throughout codebase
- Cleaner separation between CLI logic and reusable libraries

CLI commands moved: ai, ci, dev, docs, doctor, gitcmd, go, monitor,
php, pkgcmd, qa, sdk, security, setup, test, updater, vm, workspace

Libraries remaining: agentic, build, cache, cli, container, devops,
errors, framework, git, i18n, io, log, mcp, process, release, repos

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(mcp): use pkg/io Medium for sandboxed file operations

Replace manual path validation with pkg/io.Medium for all file operations.
This delegates security (path traversal, symlink bypass) to the sandboxed
local.Medium implementation.

Changes:
- Add io.NewSandboxed() for creating sandboxed Medium instances
- Refactor MCP Service to use io.Medium instead of direct os.* calls
- Remove validatePath and resolvePathWithSymlinks functions
- Update tests to verify Medium-based behaviour

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: correct import path and workflow references

- Fix pkg/io/io.go import from core-gui to core
- Update CI workflows to use internal/cmd/updater path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): address CodeRabbit review issues for path validation

- pkg/io/local: add symlink resolution and boundary-aware containment
  - Reject absolute paths in sandboxed Medium
  - Use filepath.EvalSymlinks to prevent symlink bypass attacks
  - Fix prefix check to prevent /tmp/root matching /tmp/root2

- pkg/mcp: fix resolvePath to validate and return errors
  - Changed resolvePath from (string) to (string, error)
  - Update deleteFile, renameFile, listDirectory, fileExists to handle errors
  - Changed New() to return (*Service, error) instead of *Service
  - Properly propagate option errors instead of silently discarding

- pkg/io: wrap errors with E() helper for consistent context
  - Copy() and MockMedium.Read() now use coreerr.E()

- tests: rename to use _Good/_Bad/_Ugly suffixes per coding guidelines
  - Fix hardcoded /tmp in TestPath to use t.TempDir()
  - Add TestResolvePath_Bad_SymlinkTraversal test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: fix gofmt formatting

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: fix gofmt formatting across all files

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-01 21:59:34 +00:00

217 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

package mcp
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func TestNew_Good_DefaultWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get working directory: %v", err)
}
s, err := New()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
if s.workspaceRoot != cwd {
t.Errorf("Expected default workspace root %s, got %s", cwd, s.workspaceRoot)
}
if s.medium == nil {
t.Error("Expected medium to be set")
}
}
func TestNew_Good_CustomWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
if s.workspaceRoot != tmpDir {
t.Errorf("Expected workspace root %s, got %s", tmpDir, s.workspaceRoot)
}
if s.medium == nil {
t.Error("Expected medium to be set")
}
}
func TestNew_Good_NoRestriction(t *testing.T) {
s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(""))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
if s.workspaceRoot != "" {
t.Errorf("Expected empty workspace root, got %s", s.workspaceRoot)
}
if s.medium == nil {
t.Error("Expected medium to be set (unsandboxed)")
}
}
func TestMedium_Good_ReadWrite(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
// Write a file
testContent := "hello world"
err = s.medium.Write("test.txt", testContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to write file: %v", err)
}
// Read it back
content, err := s.medium.Read("test.txt")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to read file: %v", err)
}
if content != testContent {
t.Errorf("Expected content %q, got %q", testContent, content)
}
// Verify file exists on disk
diskPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test.txt")
if _, err := os.Stat(diskPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Error("File should exist on disk")
}
}
func TestMedium_Good_EnsureDir(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
err = s.medium.EnsureDir("subdir/nested")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create directory: %v", err)
}
// Verify directory exists
diskPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir", "nested")
info, err := os.Stat(diskPath)
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Error("Directory should exist on disk")
}
if err == nil && !info.IsDir() {
t.Error("Path should be a directory")
}
}
func TestMedium_Good_IsFile(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
// File doesn't exist yet
if s.medium.IsFile("test.txt") {
t.Error("File should not exist yet")
}
// Create the file
_ = s.medium.Write("test.txt", "content")
// Now it should exist
if !s.medium.IsFile("test.txt") {
t.Error("File should exist after write")
}
}
func TestResolvePath_Good(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
// Write a test file so resolve can work
_ = s.medium.Write("test.txt", "content")
// Relative path should resolve to workspace
resolved, err := s.resolvePath("test.txt")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to resolve path: %v", err)
}
// The resolved path may be the symlink-resolved version
if !filepath.IsAbs(resolved) {
t.Errorf("Expected absolute path, got %s", resolved)
}
}
func TestResolvePath_Good_NoWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(""))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
// With no workspace, relative paths resolve to cwd
cwd, _ := os.Getwd()
resolved, err := s.resolvePath("test.txt")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to resolve path: %v", err)
}
expected := filepath.Join(cwd, "test.txt")
if resolved != expected {
t.Errorf("Expected %s, got %s", expected, resolved)
}
}
func TestResolvePath_Bad_Traversal(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
// Path traversal should fail
_, err = s.resolvePath("../secret.txt")
if err == nil {
t.Error("Expected error for path traversal")
}
// Absolute path outside workspace should fail
_, err = s.resolvePath("/etc/passwd")
if err == nil {
t.Error("Expected error for absolute path outside workspace")
}
}
func TestResolvePath_Bad_SymlinkTraversal(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
outsideDir := t.TempDir()
// Create a target file outside workspace
targetFile := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "secret.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(targetFile, []byte("secret"), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create target file: %v", err)
}
// Create symlink inside workspace pointing outside
symlinkPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "evil-link")
if err := os.Symlink(targetFile, symlinkPath); err != nil {
t.Skipf("Symlinks not supported: %v", err)
}
s, err := New(WithWorkspaceRoot(tmpDir))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create service: %v", err)
}
// Symlink traversal should be blocked
_, err = s.resolvePath("evil-link")
if err == nil {
t.Error("Expected error for symlink pointing outside workspace")
}
}