core-agent-ide/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src
viyatb-oai 0d1539e74c
fix(linux-sandbox): prefer system /usr/bin/bwrap when available (#14963)
## Problem
Ubuntu/AppArmor hosts started failing in the default Linux sandbox path
after the switch to vendored/default bubblewrap in `0.115.0`.

The clearest report is in
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), especially [this
investigation
comment](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919#issuecomment-4076504751):
on affected Ubuntu systems, `/usr/bin/bwrap` works, but a copied or
vendored `bwrap` binary fails with errors like `bwrap: setting up uid
map: Permission denied` or `bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR:
Operation not permitted`.

The root cause is Ubuntu's `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`
profile, which grants `userns` access specifically to `/usr/bin/bwrap`.
Once Codex started using a vendored/internal bubblewrap path, that path
was no longer covered by the distro AppArmor exception, so sandbox
namespace setup could fail even when user namespaces were otherwise
enabled and `uidmap` was installed.

## What this PR changes
- prefer system `/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it is available
- keep vendored bubblewrap as the fallback when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is
missing
- when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, surface a Codex startup warning
through the app-server/TUI warning path instead of printing directly
from the sandbox helper with `eprintln!`
- use the same launcher decision for both the main sandbox execution
path and the `/proc` preflight path
- document the updated Linux bubblewrap behavior in the Linux sandbox
and core READMEs

## Why this fix
This still fixes the Ubuntu/AppArmor regression from
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), but it keeps the
runtime rule simple and platform-agnostic: if the standard system
bubblewrap is installed, use it; otherwise fall back to the vendored
helper.

The warning now follows that same simple rule. If Codex cannot find
`/usr/bin/bwrap`, it tells the user that it is falling back to the
vendored helper, and it does so through the existing startup warning
plumbing that reaches the TUI and app-server instead of low-level
sandbox stderr.

## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server
tests::embedded_app_server_start_failure_is_returned`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-tui-app-server --all-targets`
2026-03-17 23:05:34 +00:00
..
bwrap.rs fix(linux-sandbox): ignore missing writable roots (#14890) 2026-03-17 00:21:00 -07:00
landlock.rs linux-sandbox: plumb split sandbox policies through helper (#13449) 2026-03-07 19:40:10 -08:00
launcher.rs fix(linux-sandbox): prefer system /usr/bin/bwrap when available (#14963) 2026-03-17 23:05:34 +00:00
lib.rs fix(linux-sandbox): prefer system /usr/bin/bwrap when available (#14963) 2026-03-17 23:05:34 +00:00
linux_run_main.rs fix(linux-sandbox): prefer system /usr/bin/bwrap when available (#14963) 2026-03-17 23:05:34 +00:00
linux_run_main_tests.rs fix: canonicalize symlinked Linux sandbox cwd (#14849) 2026-03-16 22:39:18 -07:00
main.rs fix: overhaul how we spawn commands under seccomp/landlock on Linux (#1086) 2025-05-23 11:37:07 -07:00
proxy_routing.rs feat(linux-sandbox): implement proxy-only egress via TCP-UDS-TCP bridge (#11293) 2026-02-21 18:16:34 +00:00
vendored_bwrap.rs fix(linux-sandbox): prefer system /usr/bin/bwrap when available (#14963) 2026-03-17 23:05:34 +00:00