core-agent-ide/codex-rs/linux-sandbox
viyatb-oai e8afaed502
Refactor network approvals to host/protocol/port scope (#12140)
## Summary
Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and
moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port).
Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now
treat approvals as a destination policy decision.

- Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt.
- Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate
prompts.
- Allow once approves the current queued request group only.
- Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows
future matching requests.
- Never policy continues to deny without prompting.

Example:
- 3 calls: 
  - a.com (line 443)
  - b.com (line 443)
  - a.com (line 443)
=> 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision.
- a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443

## Testing
- `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`)
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing
integration-suite failures remain in this environment)
2026-02-20 10:39:55 -08:00
..
src fix(linux-sandbox): mount /dev in bwrap sandbox (#12081) 2026-02-18 23:27:32 -08:00
tests Refactor network approvals to host/protocol/port scope (#12140) 2026-02-20 10:39:55 -08:00
BUILD.bazel build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498) 2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00
build.rs build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498) 2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00
Cargo.toml feat(linux-sandbox): add bwrap support (#9938) 2026-02-04 11:13:17 -08:00
config.h build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498) 2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00
README.md feat(sandbox): enforce proxy-aware network routing in sandbox (#11113) 2026-02-10 07:44:21 +00:00

codex-linux-sandbox

This crate is responsible for producing:

  • a codex-linux-sandbox standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
  • a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as run_main() so that
    • the codex-exec CLI can check if its arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox and, if so, execute as if it were codex-linux-sandbox
    • this should also be true of the codex multitool CLI

On Linux, the bubblewrap pipeline uses the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into this binary.

Current Behavior

  • Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as the legacy pipeline.
  • The bubblewrap pipeline is standardized on the vendored path.
  • During rollout, the bubblewrap pipeline is gated by the temporary feature flag use_linux_sandbox_bwrap (CLI -c alias for features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap; legacy remains default when off).
  • When enabled, the bubblewrap pipeline applies PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and a seccomp network filter in-process.
  • When enabled, the filesystem is read-only by default via --ro-bind / /.
  • When enabled, writable roots are layered with --bind <root> <root>.
  • When enabled, protected subpaths under writable roots (for example .git, resolved gitdir:, and .codex) are re-applied as read-only via --ro-bind.
  • When enabled, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside writable roots are blocked by mounting /dev/null on the symlink or first missing component.
  • When enabled, the helper isolates the PID namespace via --unshare-pid.
  • When enabled and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also isolates the network namespace via --unshare-net.
  • When enabled, it mounts a fresh /proc via --proc /proc by default, but you can skip this in restrictive container environments with --no-proc.

Notes

  • The CLI surface still uses legacy names like codex debug landlock.