core-agent-ide/codex-rs/exec-server/src/posix.rs
Michael Bolin 6b5b9a687e
feat: support --version flag for @openai/codex-shell-tool-mcp (#7504)
I find it helpful to easily verify which version is running.

Tested:

```shell
~/code/codex3/codex-rs/exec-server$ cargo run --bin codex-exec-mcp-server -- --help
    Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.19s
     Running `/Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/target/debug/codex-exec-mcp-server --help`
Usage: codex-exec-mcp-server [OPTIONS]

Options:
      --execve <EXECVE_WRAPPER>  Executable to delegate execve(2) calls to in Bash
      --bash <BASH_PATH>         Path to Bash that has been patched to support execve() wrapping
  -h, --help                     Print help
  -V, --version                  Print version
~/code/codex3/codex-rs/exec-server$ cargo run --bin codex-exec-mcp-server -- --version
    Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.17s
     Running `/Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/target/debug/codex-exec-mcp-server --version`
codex-exec-server 0.0.0
```
2025-12-02 23:43:25 +00:00

171 lines
5.2 KiB
Rust

//! This is an MCP that implements an alternative `shell` tool with fine-grained privilege
//! escalation based on a per-exec() policy.
//!
//! We spawn Bash process inside a sandbox. The Bash we spawn is patched to allow us to intercept
//! every exec() call it makes by invoking a wrapper program and passing in the arguments it would
//! have passed to exec(). The Bash process (and its descendants) inherit a communication socket
//! from us, and we give its fd number in the CODEX_ESCALATE_SOCKET environment variable.
//!
//! When we intercept an exec() call, we send a message over the socket back to the main
//! MCP process. The MCP process can then decide whether to allow the exec() call to proceed
//! or to escalate privileges and run the requested command with elevated permissions. In the
//! latter case, we send a message back to the child requesting that it forward its open FDs to us.
//! We then execute the requested command on its behalf, patching in the forwarded FDs.
//!
//!
//! ### The privilege escalation flow
//!
//! Child MCP Bash Escalate Helper
//! |
//! o----->o
//! | |
//! | o--(exec)-->o
//! | | |
//! |o<-(EscalateReq)--o
//! || | |
//! |o--(Escalate)---->o
//! || | |
//! |o<---------(fds)--o
//! || | |
//! o<-----o | |
//! | || | |
//! x----->o | |
//! || | |
//! |x--(exit code)--->o
//! | | |
//! | o<--(exit)--x
//! | |
//! o<-----x
//!
//! ### The non-escalation flow
//!
//! MCP Bash Escalate Helper Child
//! |
//! o----->o
//! | |
//! | o--(exec)-->o
//! | | |
//! |o<-(EscalateReq)--o
//! || | |
//! |o-(Run)---------->o
//! | | |
//! | | x--(exec)-->o
//! | | |
//! | o<--------------(exit)--x
//! | |
//! o<-----x
//!
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use clap::Parser;
use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
use tracing_subscriber::{self};
use crate::posix::mcp_escalation_policy::ExecPolicyOutcome;
mod escalate_client;
mod escalate_protocol;
mod escalate_server;
mod escalation_policy;
mod mcp;
mod mcp_escalation_policy;
mod socket;
mod stopwatch;
/// Default value of --execve option relative to the current executable.
/// Note this must match the name of the binary as specified in Cargo.toml.
const CODEX_EXECVE_WRAPPER_EXE_NAME: &str = "codex-execve-wrapper";
#[derive(Parser)]
#[clap(version)]
struct McpServerCli {
/// Executable to delegate execve(2) calls to in Bash.
#[arg(long = "execve")]
execve_wrapper: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Path to Bash that has been patched to support execve() wrapping.
#[arg(long = "bash")]
bash_path: Option<PathBuf>,
}
#[tokio::main]
pub async fn main_mcp_server() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
.with_writer(std::io::stderr)
.with_ansi(false)
.init();
let cli = McpServerCli::parse();
let execve_wrapper = match cli.execve_wrapper {
Some(path) => path,
None => {
let cwd = std::env::current_exe()?;
cwd.parent()
.map(|p| p.join(CODEX_EXECVE_WRAPPER_EXE_NAME))
.ok_or_else(|| {
anyhow::anyhow!("failed to determine execve wrapper path from current exe")
})?
}
};
let bash_path = match cli.bash_path {
Some(path) => path,
None => mcp::get_bash_path()?,
};
tracing::info!("Starting MCP server");
let service = mcp::serve(bash_path, execve_wrapper, dummy_exec_policy)
.await
.inspect_err(|e| {
tracing::error!("serving error: {:?}", e);
})?;
service.waiting().await?;
Ok(())
}
#[derive(Parser)]
pub struct ExecveWrapperCli {
file: String,
#[arg(trailing_var_arg = true)]
argv: Vec<String>,
}
#[tokio::main]
pub async fn main_execve_wrapper() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
.with_writer(std::io::stderr)
.with_ansi(false)
.init();
let ExecveWrapperCli { file, argv } = ExecveWrapperCli::parse();
let exit_code = escalate_client::run(file, argv).await?;
std::process::exit(exit_code);
}
// TODO: replace with execpolicy
fn dummy_exec_policy(file: &Path, argv: &[String], _workdir: &Path) -> ExecPolicyOutcome {
if file.ends_with("rm") {
ExecPolicyOutcome::Forbidden
} else if file.ends_with("git") {
ExecPolicyOutcome::Prompt {
run_with_escalated_permissions: false,
}
} else if file == Path::new("/opt/homebrew/bin/gh")
&& let [_, arg1, arg2, ..] = argv
&& arg1 == "issue"
&& arg2 == "list"
{
ExecPolicyOutcome::Allow {
run_with_escalated_permissions: true,
}
} else {
ExecPolicyOutcome::Allow {
run_with_escalated_permissions: false,
}
}
}