History

viyatb-oai a39d76dc45 feat(linux-sandbox): support restricted ReadOnlyAccess in bwrap (#12369 ) ## Summary Implements Linux bubblewrap support for restricted `ReadOnlyAccess` (introduced in #11387) by honoring `readable_roots` and `include_platform_defaults` instead of failing closed. ## What changed - Added a Linux platform-default read allowlist for common system/runtime paths (e.g. /usr, /etc, /lib*, Nix store roots). - Updated the bwrap filesystem mount builder to support restricted read access: - Full-read policies still use `--ro-bind / /` - Restricted-read policies now start from` --tmpfs `/ and add scoped `--ro-bind` mounts - Preserved existing writable-root and protected-subpath behavior (`.git`, `.codex`, etc.). `ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted` was already modeled in protocol, but Linux bwrap still returned `UnsupportedOperation` for restricted read access. This closes that gap for the active Linux filesystem backend. ## Notes Legacy Linux Landlock fallback still fail-closes for restricted read access (unchanged).		2026-02-27 15:25:50 -08:00
..
src	feat(linux-sandbox): support restricted ReadOnlyAccess in bwrap (#12369 )	2026-02-27 15:25:50 -08:00
tests	Revert "Ensure shell command skills trigger approval (#12697 )" (#12721 )	2026-02-25 22:49:53 +00:00
BUILD.bazel	build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498 )	2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00
build.rs	build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498 )	2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00
Cargo.toml	feat(linux-sandbox): implement proxy-only egress via TCP-UDS-TCP bridge (#11293 )	2026-02-21 18:16:34 +00:00
config.h	build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498 )	2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00
README.md	feat(linux-sandbox): implement proxy-only egress via TCP-UDS-TCP bridge (#11293 )	2026-02-21 18:16:34 +00:00

README.md

codex-linux-sandbox

This crate is responsible for producing:

a codex-linux-sandbox standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as run_main() so that
- the codex-exec CLI can check if its arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox and, if so, execute as if it were codex-linux-sandbox
- this should also be true of the codex multitool CLI

On Linux, the bubblewrap pipeline uses the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into this binary.

Current Behavior

Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as the legacy pipeline.
The bubblewrap pipeline is standardized on the vendored path.
During rollout, the bubblewrap pipeline is gated by the temporary feature flag use_linux_sandbox_bwrap (CLI -c alias for features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap; legacy remains default when off).
When enabled, the bubblewrap pipeline applies PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and a seccomp network filter in-process.
When enabled, the filesystem is read-only by default via --ro-bind / /.
When enabled, writable roots are layered with --bind <root> <root>.
When enabled, protected subpaths under writable roots (for example .git, resolved gitdir:, and .codex) are re-applied as read-only via --ro-bind.
When enabled, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside writable roots are blocked by mounting /dev/null on the symlink or first missing component.
When enabled, the helper isolates the PID namespace via --unshare-pid.
When enabled and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also isolates the network namespace via --unshare-net.
In managed proxy mode, the helper uses --unshare-net plus an internal TCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxy endpoints.
In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.
When enabled, it mounts a fresh /proc via --proc /proc by default, but you can skip this in restrictive container environments with --no-proc.

Notes

The CLI surface still uses legacy names like codex debug landlock.