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core-agent-ide/codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs
pakrym-oai 83a60fdb94
Add FS abstraction and use in view_image (#14960) 
Adds an environment crate and environment + file system abstraction.

Environment is a combination of attributes and services specific to
environment the agent is connected to:
File system, process management, OS, default shell.

The goal is to move most of agent logic that assumes environment to work
through the environment abstraction.
2026-03-17 17:36:23 -07:00

2946 lines
99 KiB
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use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::Path;
use codex_utils_image::PromptImageMode;
use codex_utils_image::load_for_prompt_bytes;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Deserializer;
use serde::Serialize;
use serde::ser::Serializer;
use ts_rs::TS;
use crate::config_types::CollaborationMode;
use crate::config_types::SandboxMode;
use crate::protocol::AskForApproval;
use crate::protocol::COLLABORATION_MODE_CLOSE_TAG;
use crate::protocol::COLLABORATION_MODE_OPEN_TAG;
use crate::protocol::GranularApprovalConfig;
use crate::protocol::NetworkAccess;
use crate::protocol::REALTIME_CONVERSATION_CLOSE_TAG;
use crate::protocol::REALTIME_CONVERSATION_OPEN_TAG;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use crate::protocol::WritableRoot;
use crate::user_input::UserInput;
use codex_execpolicy::Policy;
use codex_git::GhostCommit;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use codex_utils_image::error::ImageProcessingError;
use schemars::JsonSchema;
use crate::mcp::CallToolResult;
/// Controls the per-command sandbox override requested by a shell-like tool call.
#[derive(
Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS,
)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum SandboxPermissions {
/// Run with the turn's configured sandbox policy unchanged.
#[default]
UseDefault,
/// Request to run outside the sandbox.
RequireEscalated,
/// Request to stay in the sandbox while widening permissions for this
/// command only.
WithAdditionalPermissions,
}
impl SandboxPermissions {
/// True if SandboxPermissions requires full unsandboxed execution (i.e. RequireEscalated)
pub fn requires_escalated_permissions(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated)
}
/// True if SandboxPermissions requests any explicit per-command override
/// beyond `UseDefault`.
pub fn requests_sandbox_override(self) -> bool {
!matches!(self, SandboxPermissions::UseDefault)
}
/// True if SandboxPermissions uses the sandboxed per-command permission
/// widening flow.
pub fn uses_additional_permissions(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, SandboxPermissions::WithAdditionalPermissions)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct FileSystemPermissions {
pub read: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
pub write: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
}
impl FileSystemPermissions {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.read.is_none() && self.write.is_none()
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct NetworkPermissions {
pub enabled: Option<bool>,
}
impl NetworkPermissions {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.enabled.is_none()
}
}
#[derive(
Debug,
Clone,
PartialEq,
Eq,
PartialOrd,
Ord,
Default,
Hash,
Serialize,
Deserialize,
JsonSchema,
TS,
)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum MacOsPreferencesPermission {
None,
// IMPORTANT: ReadOnly needs to be the default because it's the
// security-sensitive default and keeps cf prefs working.
#[default]
ReadOnly,
ReadWrite,
}
#[derive(
Debug,
Clone,
PartialEq,
Eq,
PartialOrd,
Ord,
Default,
Hash,
Serialize,
Deserialize,
JsonSchema,
TS,
)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum MacOsContactsPermission {
#[default]
None,
ReadOnly,
ReadWrite,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case", try_from = "MacOsAutomationPermissionDe")]
pub enum MacOsAutomationPermission {
#[default]
None,
All,
BundleIds(Vec<String>),
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(untagged)]
enum MacOsAutomationPermissionDe {
Mode(String),
BundleIds(Vec<String>),
BundleIdsObject { bundle_ids: Vec<String> },
}
impl TryFrom<MacOsAutomationPermissionDe> for MacOsAutomationPermission {
type Error = String;
/// Accepts one of:
/// - `"none"` or `"all"`
/// - a plain list of bundle IDs, e.g. `["com.apple.Notes"]`
/// - an object with bundle IDs, e.g. `{"bundle_ids": ["com.apple.Notes"]}`
fn try_from(value: MacOsAutomationPermissionDe) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let permission = match value {
MacOsAutomationPermissionDe::Mode(value) => {
let normalized = value.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
if normalized == "all" {
MacOsAutomationPermission::All
} else if normalized == "none" {
MacOsAutomationPermission::None
} else {
return Err(format!(
"invalid macOS automation permission: {value}; expected none, all, or bundle ids"
));
}
}
MacOsAutomationPermissionDe::BundleIds(bundle_ids)
| MacOsAutomationPermissionDe::BundleIdsObject { bundle_ids } => {
let bundle_ids = bundle_ids
.into_iter()
.map(|bundle_id| bundle_id.trim().to_string())
.filter(|bundle_id| !bundle_id.is_empty())
.collect::<Vec<String>>();
if bundle_ids.is_empty() {
MacOsAutomationPermission::None
} else {
MacOsAutomationPermission::BundleIds(bundle_ids)
}
}
};
Ok(permission)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(default)]
pub struct MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions {
#[serde(alias = "preferences")]
pub macos_preferences: MacOsPreferencesPermission,
#[serde(alias = "automations")]
pub macos_automation: MacOsAutomationPermission,
#[serde(alias = "launch_services")]
pub macos_launch_services: bool,
#[serde(alias = "accessibility")]
pub macos_accessibility: bool,
#[serde(alias = "calendar")]
pub macos_calendar: bool,
#[serde(alias = "reminders")]
pub macos_reminders: bool,
#[serde(alias = "contacts")]
pub macos_contacts: MacOsContactsPermission,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct PermissionProfile {
pub network: Option<NetworkPermissions>,
pub file_system: Option<FileSystemPermissions>,
pub macos: Option<MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions>,
}
impl PermissionProfile {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.network.is_none() && self.file_system.is_none() && self.macos.is_none()
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ResponseInputItem {
Message {
role: String,
content: Vec<ContentItem>,
},
FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: String,
#[ts(as = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
#[schemars(with = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
McpToolCallOutput {
call_id: String,
output: CallToolResult,
},
CustomToolCallOutput {
call_id: String,
#[ts(as = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
#[schemars(with = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: String,
status: String,
execution: String,
#[ts(type = "unknown[]")]
tools: Vec<serde_json::Value>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ContentItem {
InputText { text: String },
InputImage { image_url: String },
OutputText { text: String },
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum ImageDetail {
Auto,
Low,
High,
Original,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
/// Classifies an assistant message as interim commentary or final answer text.
///
/// Providers do not emit this consistently, so callers must treat `None` as
/// "phase unknown" and keep compatibility behavior for legacy models.
pub enum MessagePhase {
/// Mid-turn assistant text (for example preamble/progress narration).
///
/// Additional tool calls or assistant output may follow before turn
/// completion.
Commentary,
/// The assistant's terminal answer text for the current turn.
FinalAnswer,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ResponseItem {
Message {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
role: String,
content: Vec<ContentItem>,
// Do not use directly, no available consistently across all providers.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
end_turn: Option<bool>,
// Optional output-message phase (for example: "commentary", "final_answer").
// Availability varies by provider/model, so downstream consumers must
// preserve fallback behavior when this is absent.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
phase: Option<MessagePhase>,
},
Reasoning {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
#[schemars(skip)]
id: String,
summary: Vec<ReasoningItemReasoningSummary>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "should_serialize_reasoning_content")]
#[ts(optional)]
content: Option<Vec<ReasoningItemContent>>,
encrypted_content: Option<String>,
},
LocalShellCall {
/// Legacy id field retained for compatibility with older payloads.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
/// Set when using the Responses API.
call_id: Option<String>,
status: LocalShellStatus,
action: LocalShellAction,
},
FunctionCall {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
name: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
namespace: Option<String>,
// The Responses API returns the function call arguments as a *string* that contains
// JSON, not as an already‑parsed object. We keep it as a raw string here and let
// Session::handle_function_call parse it into a Value.
arguments: String,
call_id: String,
},
ToolSearchCall {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
call_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
status: Option<String>,
execution: String,
#[ts(type = "unknown")]
arguments: serde_json::Value,
},
// NOTE: The `output` field for `function_call_output` uses a dedicated payload type with
// custom serialization. On the wire it is either:
// - a plain string (`content`)
// - an array of structured content items (`content_items`)
// We keep this behavior centralized in `FunctionCallOutputPayload`.
FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: String,
#[ts(as = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
#[schemars(with = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
CustomToolCall {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
status: Option<String>,
call_id: String,
name: String,
input: String,
},
// `custom_tool_call_output.output` uses the same wire encoding as
// `function_call_output.output` so freeform tools can return either plain
// text or structured content items.
CustomToolCallOutput {
call_id: String,
#[ts(as = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
#[schemars(with = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: Option<String>,
status: String,
execution: String,
#[ts(type = "unknown[]")]
tools: Vec<serde_json::Value>,
},
// Emitted by the Responses API when the agent triggers a web search.
// Example payload (from SSE `response.output_item.done`):
// {
// "id":"ws_...",
// "type":"web_search_call",
// "status":"completed",
// "action": {"type":"search","query":"weather: San Francisco, CA"}
// }
WebSearchCall {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
status: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
action: Option<WebSearchAction>,
},
// Emitted by the Responses API when the agent triggers image generation.
// Example payload:
// {
// "id":"ig_123",
// "type":"image_generation_call",
// "status":"completed",
// "revised_prompt":"A gray tabby cat hugging an otter...",
// "result":"..."
// }
ImageGenerationCall {
id: String,
status: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
revised_prompt: Option<String>,
result: String,
},
// Generated by the harness but considered exactly as a model response.
GhostSnapshot {
ghost_commit: GhostCommit,
},
#[serde(alias = "compaction_summary")]
Compaction {
encrypted_content: String,
},
#[serde(other)]
Other,
}
pub const BASE_INSTRUCTIONS_DEFAULT: &str = include_str!("prompts/base_instructions/default.md");
/// Base instructions for the model in a thread. Corresponds to the `instructions` field in the ResponsesAPI.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename = "base_instructions", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub struct BaseInstructions {
pub text: String,
}
impl Default for BaseInstructions {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
text: BASE_INSTRUCTIONS_DEFAULT.to_string(),
}
}
}
/// Developer-provided guidance that is injected into a turn as a developer role
/// message.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename = "developer_instructions", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub struct DeveloperInstructions {
text: String,
}
const APPROVAL_POLICY_NEVER: &str = include_str!("prompts/permissions/approval_policy/never.md");
const APPROVAL_POLICY_UNLESS_TRUSTED: &str =
include_str!("prompts/permissions/approval_policy/unless_trusted.md");
const APPROVAL_POLICY_ON_FAILURE: &str =
include_str!("prompts/permissions/approval_policy/on_failure.md");
const APPROVAL_POLICY_ON_REQUEST_RULE: &str =
include_str!("prompts/permissions/approval_policy/on_request_rule.md");
const APPROVAL_POLICY_ON_REQUEST_RULE_REQUEST_PERMISSION: &str =
include_str!("prompts/permissions/approval_policy/on_request_rule_request_permission.md");
const SANDBOX_MODE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS: &str =
include_str!("prompts/permissions/sandbox_mode/danger_full_access.md");
const SANDBOX_MODE_WORKSPACE_WRITE: &str =
include_str!("prompts/permissions/sandbox_mode/workspace_write.md");
const SANDBOX_MODE_READ_ONLY: &str = include_str!("prompts/permissions/sandbox_mode/read_only.md");
const REALTIME_START_INSTRUCTIONS: &str = include_str!("prompts/realtime/realtime_start.md");
const REALTIME_END_INSTRUCTIONS: &str = include_str!("prompts/realtime/realtime_end.md");
impl DeveloperInstructions {
pub fn new<T: Into<String>>(text: T) -> Self {
Self { text: text.into() }
}
pub fn from(
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
exec_policy: &Policy,
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: bool,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: bool,
) -> DeveloperInstructions {
let with_request_permissions_tool = |text: &str| {
if request_permissions_tool_enabled {
format!("{text}\n\n{}", request_permissions_tool_prompt_section())
} else {
text.to_string()
}
};
let on_request_instructions = || {
let on_request_rule = if exec_permission_approvals_enabled {
APPROVAL_POLICY_ON_REQUEST_RULE_REQUEST_PERMISSION.to_string()
} else {
APPROVAL_POLICY_ON_REQUEST_RULE.to_string()
};
let mut sections = vec![on_request_rule];
if request_permissions_tool_enabled {
sections.push(request_permissions_tool_prompt_section().to_string());
}
if let Some(prefixes) = approved_command_prefixes_text(exec_policy) {
sections.push(format!(
"## Approved command prefixes\nThe following prefix rules have already been approved: {prefixes}"
));
}
sections.join("\n\n")
};
let text = match approval_policy {
AskForApproval::Never => APPROVAL_POLICY_NEVER.to_string(),
AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted => {
with_request_permissions_tool(APPROVAL_POLICY_UNLESS_TRUSTED)
}
AskForApproval::OnFailure => with_request_permissions_tool(APPROVAL_POLICY_ON_FAILURE),
AskForApproval::OnRequest => on_request_instructions(),
AskForApproval::Granular(granular_config) => granular_instructions(
granular_config,
exec_policy,
exec_permission_approvals_enabled,
request_permissions_tool_enabled,
),
};
DeveloperInstructions::new(text)
}
pub fn into_text(self) -> String {
self.text
}
pub fn concat(self, other: impl Into<DeveloperInstructions>) -> Self {
let mut text = self.text;
if !text.ends_with('\n') {
text.push('\n');
}
text.push_str(&other.into().text);
Self { text }
}
pub fn model_switch_message(model_instructions: String) -> Self {
DeveloperInstructions::new(format!(
"<model_switch>\nThe user was previously using a different model. Please continue the conversation according to the following instructions:\n\n{model_instructions}\n</model_switch>"
))
}
pub fn realtime_start_message() -> Self {
Self::realtime_start_message_with_instructions(REALTIME_START_INSTRUCTIONS.trim())
}
pub fn realtime_start_message_with_instructions(instructions: &str) -> Self {
DeveloperInstructions::new(format!(
"{REALTIME_CONVERSATION_OPEN_TAG}\n{instructions}\n{REALTIME_CONVERSATION_CLOSE_TAG}"
))
}
pub fn realtime_end_message(reason: &str) -> Self {
DeveloperInstructions::new(format!(
"{REALTIME_CONVERSATION_OPEN_TAG}\n{}\n\nReason: {reason}\n{REALTIME_CONVERSATION_CLOSE_TAG}",
REALTIME_END_INSTRUCTIONS.trim()
))
}
pub fn personality_spec_message(spec: String) -> Self {
let message = format!(
"<personality_spec> The user has requested a new communication style. Future messages should adhere to the following personality: \n{spec} </personality_spec>"
);
DeveloperInstructions::new(message)
}
pub fn from_policy(
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
exec_policy: &Policy,
cwd: &Path,
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: bool,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: bool,
) -> Self {
let network_access = if sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() {
NetworkAccess::Enabled
} else {
NetworkAccess::Restricted
};
let (sandbox_mode, writable_roots) = match sandbox_policy {
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess => (SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess, None),
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. } => (SandboxMode::ReadOnly, None),
SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => (SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess, None),
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => {
let roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd);
(SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite, Some(roots))
}
};
DeveloperInstructions::from_permissions_with_network(
sandbox_mode,
network_access,
approval_policy,
exec_policy,
writable_roots,
exec_permission_approvals_enabled,
request_permissions_tool_enabled,
)
}
/// Returns developer instructions from a collaboration mode if they exist and are non-empty.
pub fn from_collaboration_mode(collaboration_mode: &CollaborationMode) -> Option<Self> {
collaboration_mode
.settings
.developer_instructions
.as_ref()
.filter(|instructions| !instructions.is_empty())
.map(|instructions| {
DeveloperInstructions::new(format!(
"{COLLABORATION_MODE_OPEN_TAG}{instructions}{COLLABORATION_MODE_CLOSE_TAG}"
))
})
}
fn from_permissions_with_network(
sandbox_mode: SandboxMode,
network_access: NetworkAccess,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
exec_policy: &Policy,
writable_roots: Option<Vec<WritableRoot>>,
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: bool,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: bool,
) -> Self {
let start_tag = DeveloperInstructions::new("<permissions instructions>");
let end_tag = DeveloperInstructions::new("</permissions instructions>");
start_tag
.concat(DeveloperInstructions::sandbox_text(
sandbox_mode,
network_access,
))
.concat(DeveloperInstructions::from(
approval_policy,
exec_policy,
exec_permission_approvals_enabled,
request_permissions_tool_enabled,
))
.concat(DeveloperInstructions::from_writable_roots(writable_roots))
.concat(end_tag)
}
fn from_writable_roots(writable_roots: Option<Vec<WritableRoot>>) -> Self {
let Some(roots) = writable_roots else {
return DeveloperInstructions::new("");
};
if roots.is_empty() {
return DeveloperInstructions::new("");
}
let roots_list: Vec<String> = roots
.iter()
.map(|r| format!("`{}`", r.root.to_string_lossy()))
.collect();
let text = if roots_list.len() == 1 {
format!(" The writable root is {}.", roots_list[0])
} else {
format!(" The writable roots are {}.", roots_list.join(", "))
};
DeveloperInstructions::new(text)
}
fn sandbox_text(mode: SandboxMode, network_access: NetworkAccess) -> DeveloperInstructions {
let template = match mode {
SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess => SANDBOX_MODE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS.trim_end(),
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite => SANDBOX_MODE_WORKSPACE_WRITE.trim_end(),
SandboxMode::ReadOnly => SANDBOX_MODE_READ_ONLY.trim_end(),
};
let text = template.replace("{network_access}", &network_access.to_string());
DeveloperInstructions::new(text)
}
}
fn approved_command_prefixes_text(exec_policy: &Policy) -> Option<String> {
format_allow_prefixes(exec_policy.get_allowed_prefixes())
.filter(|prefixes| !prefixes.is_empty())
}
fn granular_prompt_intro_text() -> &'static str {
"# Approval Requests\n\nApproval policy is `granular`. Categories set to `false` are automatically rejected instead of prompting the user."
}
fn request_permissions_tool_prompt_section() -> &'static str {
"# request_permissions Tool\n\nThe built-in `request_permissions` tool is available in this session. Invoke it when you need to request additional `network`, `file_system`, or `macos` permissions before later shell-like commands need them. Request only the specific permissions required for the task."
}
fn granular_instructions(
granular_config: GranularApprovalConfig,
exec_policy: &Policy,
exec_permission_approvals_enabled: bool,
request_permissions_tool_enabled: bool,
) -> String {
let sandbox_approval_prompts_allowed = granular_config.allows_sandbox_approval();
let shell_permission_requests_available =
exec_permission_approvals_enabled && sandbox_approval_prompts_allowed;
let request_permissions_tool_prompts_allowed =
request_permissions_tool_enabled && granular_config.allows_request_permissions();
let categories = [
Some((
granular_config.allows_sandbox_approval(),
"`sandbox_approval`",
)),
Some((granular_config.allows_rules_approval(), "`rules`")),
Some((granular_config.allows_skill_approval(), "`skill_approval`")),
request_permissions_tool_enabled.then_some((
granular_config.allows_request_permissions(),
"`request_permissions`",
)),
Some((
granular_config.allows_mcp_elicitations(),
"`mcp_elicitations`",
)),
];
let prompted_categories = categories
.iter()
.flatten()
.filter(|&&(is_allowed, _)| is_allowed)
.map(|&(_, category)| format!("- {category}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let rejected_categories = categories
.iter()
.flatten()
.filter(|&&(is_allowed, _)| !is_allowed)
.map(|&(_, category)| format!("- {category}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let mut sections = vec![granular_prompt_intro_text().to_string()];
if !prompted_categories.is_empty() {
sections.push(format!(
"These approval categories may still prompt the user when needed:\n{}",
prompted_categories.join("\n")
));
}
if !rejected_categories.is_empty() {
sections.push(format!(
"These approval categories are automatically rejected instead of prompting the user:\n{}",
rejected_categories.join("\n")
));
}
if shell_permission_requests_available {
sections.push(APPROVAL_POLICY_ON_REQUEST_RULE_REQUEST_PERMISSION.to_string());
}
if request_permissions_tool_prompts_allowed {
sections.push(request_permissions_tool_prompt_section().to_string());
}
if let Some(prefixes) = approved_command_prefixes_text(exec_policy) {
sections.push(format!(
"## Approved command prefixes\nThe following prefix rules have already been approved: {prefixes}"
));
}
sections.join("\n\n")
}
const MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES: usize = 100;
const MAX_ALLOW_PREFIX_TEXT_BYTES: usize = 5000;
const TRUNCATED_MARKER: &str = "...\n[Some commands were truncated]";
pub fn format_allow_prefixes(prefixes: Vec<Vec<String>>) -> Option<String> {
let mut truncated = false;
if prefixes.len() > MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES {
truncated = true;
}
let mut prefixes = prefixes;
prefixes.sort_by(|a, b| {
a.len()
.cmp(&b.len())
.then_with(|| prefix_combined_str_len(a).cmp(&prefix_combined_str_len(b)))
.then_with(|| a.cmp(b))
});
let full_text = prefixes
.into_iter()
.take(MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES)
.map(|prefix| format!("- {}", render_command_prefix(&prefix)))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n");
// truncate to last UTF8 char
let mut output = full_text;
let byte_idx = output
.char_indices()
.nth(MAX_ALLOW_PREFIX_TEXT_BYTES)
.map(|(i, _)| i);
if let Some(byte_idx) = byte_idx {
truncated = true;
output = output[..byte_idx].to_string();
}
if truncated {
Some(format!("{output}{TRUNCATED_MARKER}"))
} else {
Some(output)
}
}
fn prefix_combined_str_len(prefix: &[String]) -> usize {
prefix.iter().map(String::len).sum()
}
fn render_command_prefix(prefix: &[String]) -> String {
let tokens = prefix
.iter()
.map(|token| serde_json::to_string(token).unwrap_or_else(|_| format!("{token:?}")))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ");
format!("[{tokens}]")
}
impl From<DeveloperInstructions> for ResponseItem {
fn from(di: DeveloperInstructions) -> Self {
ResponseItem::Message {
id: None,
role: "developer".to_string(),
content: vec![ContentItem::InputText {
text: di.into_text(),
}],
end_turn: None,
phase: None,
}
}
}
impl From<SandboxMode> for DeveloperInstructions {
fn from(mode: SandboxMode) -> Self {
let network_access = match mode {
SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess => NetworkAccess::Enabled,
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite | SandboxMode::ReadOnly => NetworkAccess::Restricted,
};
DeveloperInstructions::sandbox_text(mode, network_access)
}
}
fn should_serialize_reasoning_content(content: &Option<Vec<ReasoningItemContent>>) -> bool {
match content {
Some(content) => !content
.iter()
.any(|c| matches!(c, ReasoningItemContent::ReasoningText { .. })),
None => false,
}
}
fn local_image_error_placeholder(
path: &std::path::Path,
error: impl std::fmt::Display,
) -> ContentItem {
ContentItem::InputText {
text: format!(
"Codex could not read the local image at `{}`: {}",
path.display(),
error
),
}
}
pub const VIEW_IMAGE_TOOL_NAME: &str = "view_image";
const IMAGE_OPEN_TAG: &str = "";
const LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_PREFIX: &str = "<image name=";
const LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_SUFFIX: &str = ">";
const LOCAL_IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG: &str = IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG;
pub fn image_open_tag_text() -> String {
IMAGE_OPEN_TAG.to_string()
}
pub fn image_close_tag_text() -> String {
IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG.to_string()
}
pub fn local_image_label_text(label_number: usize) -> String {
format!("[Image #{label_number}]")
}
pub fn local_image_open_tag_text(label_number: usize) -> String {
let label = local_image_label_text(label_number);
format!("{LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_PREFIX}{label}{LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_SUFFIX}")
}
pub fn is_local_image_open_tag_text(text: &str) -> bool {
text.strip_prefix(LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_PREFIX)
.is_some_and(|rest| rest.ends_with(LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_SUFFIX))
}
pub fn is_local_image_close_tag_text(text: &str) -> bool {
is_image_close_tag_text(text)
}
pub fn is_image_open_tag_text(text: &str) -> bool {
text == IMAGE_OPEN_TAG
}
pub fn is_image_close_tag_text(text: &str) -> bool {
text == IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG
}
fn invalid_image_error_placeholder(
path: &std::path::Path,
error: impl std::fmt::Display,
) -> ContentItem {
ContentItem::InputText {
text: format!(
"Image located at `{}` is invalid: {}",
path.display(),
error
),
}
}
fn unsupported_image_error_placeholder(path: &std::path::Path, mime: &str) -> ContentItem {
ContentItem::InputText {
text: format!(
"Codex cannot attach image at `{}`: unsupported image format `{}`.",
path.display(),
mime
),
}
}
pub fn local_image_content_items_with_label_number(
path: &std::path::Path,
file_bytes: Vec<u8>,
label_number: Option<usize>,
mode: PromptImageMode,
) -> Vec<ContentItem> {
match load_for_prompt_bytes(path, file_bytes, mode) {
Ok(image) => {
let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(3);
if let Some(label_number) = label_number {
items.push(ContentItem::InputText {
text: local_image_open_tag_text(label_number),
});
}
items.push(ContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: image.into_data_url(),
});
if label_number.is_some() {
items.push(ContentItem::InputText {
text: LOCAL_IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG.to_string(),
});
}
items
}
Err(err) => {
if matches!(&err, ImageProcessingError::Read { .. }) {
vec![local_image_error_placeholder(path, &err)]
} else if err.is_invalid_image() {
vec![invalid_image_error_placeholder(path, &err)]
} else {
let Some(mime_guess) = mime_guess::from_path(path).first() else {
return vec![local_image_error_placeholder(
path,
"unsupported MIME type (unknown)",
)];
};
let mime = mime_guess.essence_str().to_owned();
if !mime.starts_with("image/") {
return vec![local_image_error_placeholder(
path,
format!("unsupported MIME type `{mime}`"),
)];
}
vec![unsupported_image_error_placeholder(path, &mime)]
}
}
}
}
impl From<ResponseInputItem> for ResponseItem {
fn from(item: ResponseInputItem) -> Self {
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { role, content } => Self::Message {
role,
content,
id: None,
end_turn: None,
phase: None,
},
ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput { call_id, output } => {
Self::FunctionCallOutput { call_id, output }
}
ResponseInputItem::McpToolCallOutput { call_id, output } => {
let output = output.into_function_call_output_payload();
Self::FunctionCallOutput { call_id, output }
}
ResponseInputItem::CustomToolCallOutput { call_id, output } => {
Self::CustomToolCallOutput { call_id, output }
}
ResponseInputItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id,
status,
execution,
tools,
} => Self::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: Some(call_id),
status,
execution,
tools,
},
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum LocalShellStatus {
Completed,
InProgress,
Incomplete,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum LocalShellAction {
Exec(LocalShellExecAction),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct LocalShellExecAction {
pub command: Vec<String>,
pub timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
pub working_directory: Option<String>,
pub env: Option<HashMap<String, String>>,
pub user: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[schemars(rename = "ResponsesApiWebSearchAction")]
pub enum WebSearchAction {
Search {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
query: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
queries: Option<Vec<String>>,
},
OpenPage {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
url: Option<String>,
},
FindInPage {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
url: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pattern: Option<String>,
},
#[serde(other)]
Other,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ReasoningItemReasoningSummary {
SummaryText { text: String },
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ReasoningItemContent {
ReasoningText { text: String },
Text { text: String },
}
impl From<Vec<UserInput>> for ResponseInputItem {
fn from(items: Vec<UserInput>) -> Self {
let mut image_index = 0;
Self::Message {
role: "user".to_string(),
content: items
.into_iter()
.flat_map(|c| match c {
UserInput::Text { text, .. } => vec![ContentItem::InputText { text }],
UserInput::Image { image_url } => {
image_index += 1;
vec![
ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_open_tag_text(),
},
ContentItem::InputImage { image_url },
ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_close_tag_text(),
},
]
}
UserInput::LocalImage { path } => {
image_index += 1;
match std::fs::read(&path) {
Ok(file_bytes) => local_image_content_items_with_label_number(
&path,
file_bytes,
Some(image_index),
PromptImageMode::ResizeToFit,
),
Err(err) => vec![local_image_error_placeholder(&path, err)],
}
}
UserInput::Skill { .. } | UserInput::Mention { .. } => Vec::new(), // Tool bodies are injected later in core
})
.collect::<Vec<ContentItem>>(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct SearchToolCallParams {
pub query: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub limit: Option<usize>,
}
/// If the `name` of a `ResponseItem::FunctionCall` is either `container.exec`
/// or `shell`, the `arguments` field should deserialize to this struct.
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct ShellToolCallParams {
pub command: Vec<String>,
pub workdir: Option<String>,
/// This is the maximum time in milliseconds that the command is allowed to run.
#[serde(alias = "timeout")]
pub timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub sandbox_permissions: Option<SandboxPermissions>,
/// Suggests a command prefix to persist for future sessions
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub prefix_rule: Option<Vec<String>>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub additional_permissions: Option<PermissionProfile>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub justification: Option<String>,
}
/// If the `name` of a `ResponseItem::FunctionCall` is `shell_command`, the
/// `arguments` field should deserialize to this struct.
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct ShellCommandToolCallParams {
pub command: String,
pub workdir: Option<String>,
/// Whether to run the shell with login shell semantics
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub login: Option<bool>,
/// This is the maximum time in milliseconds that the command is allowed to run.
#[serde(alias = "timeout")]
pub timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub sandbox_permissions: Option<SandboxPermissions>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub prefix_rule: Option<Vec<String>>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub additional_permissions: Option<PermissionProfile>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub justification: Option<String>,
}
/// Responses API compatible content items that can be returned by a tool call.
/// This is a subset of ContentItem with the types we support as function call outputs.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum FunctionCallOutputContentItem {
// Do not rename, these are serialized and used directly in the responses API.
InputText {
text: String,
},
// Do not rename, these are serialized and used directly in the responses API.
InputImage {
image_url: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
detail: Option<ImageDetail>,
},
}
/// Converts structured function-call output content into plain text for
/// human-readable surfaces.
///
/// This conversion is intentionally lossy:
/// - only `input_text` items are included
/// - image items are ignored
///
/// We use this helper where callers still need a string representation (for
/// example telemetry previews or legacy string-only output paths) while keeping
/// the original multimodal `content_items` as the authoritative payload sent to
/// the model.
pub fn function_call_output_content_items_to_text(
content_items: &[FunctionCallOutputContentItem],
) -> Option<String> {
let text_segments = content_items
.iter()
.filter_map(|item| match item {
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText { text } if !text.trim().is_empty() => {
Some(text.as_str())
}
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText { .. }
| FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage { .. } => None,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if text_segments.is_empty() {
None
} else {
Some(text_segments.join("\n"))
}
}
impl From<crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallOutputContentItem>
for FunctionCallOutputContentItem
{
fn from(item: crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallOutputContentItem) -> Self {
match item {
crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallOutputContentItem::InputText { text } => {
Self::InputText { text }
}
crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallOutputContentItem::InputImage { image_url } => {
Self::InputImage {
image_url,
detail: None,
}
}
}
}
}
/// The payload we send back to OpenAI when reporting a tool call result.
///
/// `body` serializes directly as the wire value for `function_call_output.output`.
/// `success` remains internal metadata for downstream handling.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct FunctionCallOutputPayload {
pub body: FunctionCallOutputBody,
pub success: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(untagged)]
pub enum FunctionCallOutputBody {
Text(String),
ContentItems(Vec<FunctionCallOutputContentItem>),
}
impl FunctionCallOutputBody {
/// Best-effort conversion of a function-call output body to plain text for
/// human-readable surfaces.
///
/// This conversion is intentionally lossy when the body contains content
/// items: image entries are dropped and text entries are joined with
/// newlines.
pub fn to_text(&self) -> Option<String> {
match self {
Self::Text(content) => Some(content.clone()),
Self::ContentItems(items) => function_call_output_content_items_to_text(items),
}
}
}
impl Default for FunctionCallOutputBody {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::Text(String::new())
}
}
impl FunctionCallOutputPayload {
pub fn from_text(content: String) -> Self {
Self {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content),
success: None,
}
}
pub fn from_content_items(content_items: Vec<FunctionCallOutputContentItem>) -> Self {
Self {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(content_items),
success: None,
}
}
pub fn text_content(&self) -> Option<&str> {
match &self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content) => Some(content),
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(_) => None,
}
}
pub fn text_content_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut String> {
match &mut self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content) => Some(content),
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(_) => None,
}
}
pub fn content_items(&self) -> Option<&[FunctionCallOutputContentItem]> {
match &self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(_) => None,
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(items) => Some(items),
}
}
pub fn content_items_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut Vec<FunctionCallOutputContentItem>> {
match &mut self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(_) => None,
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(items) => Some(items),
}
}
}
// `function_call_output.output` is encoded as either:
// - an array of structured content items
// - a plain string
impl Serialize for FunctionCallOutputPayload {
fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
S: Serializer,
{
match &self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content) => serializer.serialize_str(content),
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(items) => items.serialize(serializer),
}
}
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for FunctionCallOutputPayload {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
let body = FunctionCallOutputBody::deserialize(deserializer)?;
Ok(FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body,
success: None,
})
}
}
impl CallToolResult {
pub fn from_result(result: Result<Self, String>) -> Self {
match result {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(error) => Self::from_error_text(error),
}
}
pub fn from_error_text(text: String) -> Self {
Self {
content: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "text",
"text": text,
})],
structured_content: None,
is_error: Some(true),
meta: None,
}
}
pub fn success(&self) -> bool {
self.is_error != Some(true)
}
pub fn as_function_call_output_payload(&self) -> FunctionCallOutputPayload {
if let Some(structured_content) = &self.structured_content
&& !structured_content.is_null()
{
match serde_json::to_string(structured_content) {
Ok(serialized_structured_content) => {
return FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(serialized_structured_content),
success: Some(self.success()),
};
}
Err(err) => {
return FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(err.to_string()),
success: Some(false),
};
}
}
}
let serialized_content = match serde_json::to_string(&self.content) {
Ok(serialized_content) => serialized_content,
Err(err) => {
return FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(err.to_string()),
success: Some(false),
};
}
};
let content_items = convert_mcp_content_to_items(&self.content);
let body = match content_items {
Some(content_items) => FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(content_items),
None => FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(serialized_content),
};
FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body,
success: Some(self.success()),
}
}
pub fn into_function_call_output_payload(self) -> FunctionCallOutputPayload {
self.as_function_call_output_payload()
}
}
fn convert_mcp_content_to_items(
contents: &[serde_json::Value],
) -> Option<Vec<FunctionCallOutputContentItem>> {
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type")]
enum McpContent {
#[serde(rename = "text")]
Text { text: String },
#[serde(rename = "image")]
Image {
data: String,
#[serde(rename = "mimeType", alias = "mime_type")]
mime_type: Option<String>,
},
#[serde(other)]
Unknown,
}
let mut saw_image = false;
let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(contents.len());
for content in contents {
let item = match serde_json::from_value::<McpContent>(content.clone()) {
Ok(McpContent::Text { text }) => FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText { text },
Ok(McpContent::Image { data, mime_type }) => {
saw_image = true;
let image_url = if data.starts_with("data:") {
data
} else {
let mime_type = mime_type.unwrap_or_else(|| "application/octet-stream".into());
format!("data:{mime_type};base64,{data}")
};
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url,
detail: None,
}
}
Ok(McpContent::Unknown) | Err(_) => FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: serde_json::to_string(content).unwrap_or_else(|_| "<content>".to_string()),
},
};
items.push(item);
}
if saw_image { Some(items) } else { None }
}
// Implement Display so callers can treat the payload like a plain string when logging or doing
// trivial substring checks in tests (existing tests call `.contains()` on the output). For
// `ContentItems`, Display emits a JSON representation.
impl std::fmt::Display for FunctionCallOutputPayload {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match &self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content) => f.write_str(content),
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(items) => {
let content = serde_json::to_string(items).unwrap_or_default();
f.write_str(content.as_str())
}
}
}
}
// (Moved event mapping logic into codex-core to avoid coupling protocol to UI-facing events.)
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::config_types::SandboxMode;
use crate::protocol::AskForApproval;
use crate::protocol::GranularApprovalConfig;
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_execpolicy::Policy;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn sandbox_permissions_helpers_match_documented_semantics() {
let cases = [
(SandboxPermissions::UseDefault, false, false, false),
(SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated, true, true, false),
(
SandboxPermissions::WithAdditionalPermissions,
false,
true,
true,
),
];
for (
sandbox_permissions,
requires_escalated_permissions,
requests_sandbox_override,
uses_additional_permissions,
) in cases
{
assert_eq!(
sandbox_permissions.requires_escalated_permissions(),
requires_escalated_permissions
);
assert_eq!(
sandbox_permissions.requests_sandbox_override(),
requests_sandbox_override
);
assert_eq!(
sandbox_permissions.uses_additional_permissions(),
uses_additional_permissions
);
}
}
#[test]
fn convert_mcp_content_to_items_preserves_data_urls() {
let contents = vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "image",
"data": "",
"mimeType": "image/png",
})];
let items = convert_mcp_content_to_items(&contents).expect("expected image items");
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: None,
}]
);
}
#[test]
fn response_item_parses_image_generation_call() {
let item = serde_json::from_value::<ResponseItem>(serde_json::json!({
"id": "ig_123",
"type": "image_generation_call",
"status": "completed",
"revised_prompt": "A small blue square",
"result": "Zm9v",
}))
.expect("image generation item should deserialize");
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::ImageGenerationCall {
id: "ig_123".to_string(),
status: "completed".to_string(),
revised_prompt: Some("A small blue square".to_string()),
result: "Zm9v".to_string(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn response_item_parses_image_generation_call_without_revised_prompt() {
let item = serde_json::from_value::<ResponseItem>(serde_json::json!({
"id": "ig_123",
"type": "image_generation_call",
"status": "completed",
"result": "Zm9v",
}))
.expect("image generation item should deserialize");
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::ImageGenerationCall {
id: "ig_123".to_string(),
status: "completed".to_string(),
revised_prompt: None,
result: "Zm9v".to_string(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_is_empty_when_all_fields_are_none() {
assert_eq!(PermissionProfile::default().is_empty(), true);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_is_not_empty_when_field_is_present_but_nested_empty() {
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile {
network: Some(NetworkPermissions { enabled: None }),
file_system: None,
macos: None,
};
assert_eq!(permission_profile.is_empty(), false);
}
#[test]
fn macos_preferences_permission_deserializes_read_write() {
let permission = serde_json::from_str::<MacOsPreferencesPermission>("\"read_write\"")
.expect("deserialize macos preferences permission");
assert_eq!(permission, MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadWrite);
}
#[test]
fn macos_preferences_permission_order_matches_permissiveness() {
assert!(MacOsPreferencesPermission::None < MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadOnly);
assert!(MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadOnly < MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadWrite);
}
#[test]
fn macos_contacts_permission_order_matches_permissiveness() {
assert!(MacOsContactsPermission::None < MacOsContactsPermission::ReadOnly);
assert!(MacOsContactsPermission::ReadOnly < MacOsContactsPermission::ReadWrite);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_deserializes_macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions() {
let permission_profile = serde_json::from_value::<PermissionProfile>(serde_json::json!({
"network": null,
"file_system": null,
"macos": {
"macos_preferences": "read_write",
"macos_automation": ["com.apple.Notes"],
"macos_launch_services": true,
"macos_accessibility": true,
"macos_calendar": true
}
}))
.expect("deserialize permission profile");
assert_eq!(
permission_profile,
PermissionProfile {
network: None,
file_system: None,
macos: Some(MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions {
macos_preferences: MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadWrite,
macos_automation: MacOsAutomationPermission::BundleIds(vec![
"com.apple.Notes".to_string(),
]),
macos_launch_services: true,
macos_accessibility: true,
macos_calendar: true,
macos_reminders: false,
macos_contacts: MacOsContactsPermission::None,
}),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_deserializes_macos_reminders_permission() {
let permission_profile = serde_json::from_value::<PermissionProfile>(serde_json::json!({
"macos": {
"macos_reminders": true
}
}))
.expect("deserialize reminders permission profile");
assert_eq!(
permission_profile,
PermissionProfile {
network: None,
file_system: None,
macos: Some(MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions {
macos_preferences: MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadOnly,
macos_automation: MacOsAutomationPermission::None,
macos_launch_services: false,
macos_accessibility: false,
macos_calendar: false,
macos_reminders: true,
macos_contacts: MacOsContactsPermission::None,
}),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions_deserializes_missing_fields_to_defaults() {
let permissions =
serde_json::from_value::<MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions>(serde_json::json!({
"macos_automation": ["com.apple.Notes"]
}))
.expect("deserialize macos permissions");
assert_eq!(
permissions,
MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions {
macos_preferences: MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadOnly,
macos_automation: MacOsAutomationPermission::BundleIds(vec![
"com.apple.Notes".to_string(),
]),
macos_launch_services: false,
macos_accessibility: false,
macos_calendar: false,
macos_reminders: false,
macos_contacts: MacOsContactsPermission::None,
}
);
}
#[test]
fn macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions_deserializes_tool_schema_aliases() {
let permissions =
serde_json::from_value::<MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions>(serde_json::json!({
"preferences": "read_write",
"automations": ["com.apple.Notes"],
"launch_services": true,
"accessibility": true,
"calendar": true,
"reminders": true,
"contacts": "read_only"
}))
.expect("deserialize macos permissions");
assert_eq!(
permissions,
MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions {
macos_preferences: MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadWrite,
macos_automation: MacOsAutomationPermission::BundleIds(vec![
"com.apple.Notes".to_string(),
]),
macos_launch_services: true,
macos_accessibility: true,
macos_calendar: true,
macos_reminders: true,
macos_contacts: MacOsContactsPermission::ReadOnly,
}
);
}
#[test]
fn macos_automation_permission_deserializes_all_and_none() {
let all = serde_json::from_str::<MacOsAutomationPermission>("\"all\"")
.expect("deserialize all automation permission");
let none = serde_json::from_str::<MacOsAutomationPermission>("\"none\"")
.expect("deserialize none automation permission");
assert_eq!(all, MacOsAutomationPermission::All);
assert_eq!(none, MacOsAutomationPermission::None);
}
#[test]
fn macos_automation_permission_deserializes_bundle_ids_object() {
let permission = serde_json::from_value::<MacOsAutomationPermission>(serde_json::json!({
"bundle_ids": ["com.apple.Notes"]
}))
.expect("deserialize bundle_ids object automation permission");
assert_eq!(
permission,
MacOsAutomationPermission::BundleIds(vec!["com.apple.Notes".to_string(),])
);
}
#[test]
fn convert_mcp_content_to_items_builds_data_urls_when_missing_prefix() {
let contents = vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "image",
"data": "Zm9v",
"mimeType": "image/png",
})];
let items = convert_mcp_content_to_items(&contents).expect("expected image items");
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: None,
}]
);
}
#[test]
fn convert_mcp_content_to_items_returns_none_without_images() {
let contents = vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "text",
"text": "hello",
})];
assert_eq!(convert_mcp_content_to_items(&contents), None);
}
#[test]
fn function_call_output_content_items_to_text_joins_text_segments() {
let content_items = vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "line 1".to_string(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: None,
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "line 2".to_string(),
},
];
let text = function_call_output_content_items_to_text(&content_items);
assert_eq!(text, Some("line 1\nline 2".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn function_call_output_content_items_to_text_ignores_blank_text_and_images() {
let content_items = vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: " ".to_string(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: None,
},
];
let text = function_call_output_content_items_to_text(&content_items);
assert_eq!(text, None);
}
#[test]
fn function_call_output_body_to_text_returns_plain_text_content() {
let body = FunctionCallOutputBody::Text("ok".to_string());
let text = body.to_text();
assert_eq!(text, Some("ok".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn function_call_output_body_to_text_uses_content_item_fallback() {
let body = FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "line 1".to_string(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: None,
},
]);
let text = body.to_text();
assert_eq!(text, Some("line 1".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn function_call_deserializes_optional_namespace() {
let item: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
"type": "function_call",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__gmail_get_recent_emails",
"namespace": "mcp__codex_apps__gmail",
"arguments": "{\"top_k\":5}",
"call_id": "call-1",
}))
.expect("function_call should deserialize");
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::FunctionCall {
id: None,
name: "mcp__codex_apps__gmail_get_recent_emails".to_string(),
namespace: Some("mcp__codex_apps__gmail".to_string()),
arguments: "{\"top_k\":5}".to_string(),
call_id: "call-1".to_string(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn converts_sandbox_mode_into_developer_instructions() {
let workspace_write: DeveloperInstructions = SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite.into();
assert_eq!(
workspace_write,
DeveloperInstructions::new(
"Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `workspace-write`: The sandbox permits reading files, and editing files in `cwd` and `writable_roots`. Editing files in other directories requires approval. Network access is restricted."
)
);
let read_only: DeveloperInstructions = SandboxMode::ReadOnly.into();
assert_eq!(
read_only,
DeveloperInstructions::new(
"Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `read-only`: The sandbox only permits reading files. Network access is restricted."
)
);
}
#[test]
fn builds_permissions_with_network_access_override() {
let instructions = DeveloperInstructions::from_permissions_with_network(
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite,
NetworkAccess::Enabled,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&Policy::empty(),
None,
false,
false,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
assert!(
text.contains("Network access is enabled."),
"expected network access to be enabled in message"
);
assert!(
text.contains("How to request escalation"),
"expected approval guidance to be included"
);
}
#[test]
fn builds_permissions_from_policy() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
read_only_access: Default::default(),
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
};
let instructions = DeveloperInstructions::from_policy(
&policy,
AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted,
&Policy::empty(),
&PathBuf::from("/tmp"),
false,
false,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
assert!(text.contains("Network access is enabled."));
assert!(text.contains("`approval_policy` is `unless-trusted`"));
}
#[test]
fn includes_request_rule_instructions_for_on_request() {
let mut exec_policy = Policy::empty();
exec_policy
.add_prefix_rule(
&["git".to_string(), "pull".to_string()],
codex_execpolicy::Decision::Allow,
)
.expect("add rule");
let instructions = DeveloperInstructions::from_permissions_with_network(
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite,
NetworkAccess::Enabled,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&exec_policy,
None,
false,
false,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
assert!(text.contains("prefix_rule"));
assert!(text.contains("Approved command prefixes"));
assert!(text.contains(r#"["git", "pull"]"#));
}
#[test]
fn includes_request_permissions_tool_instructions_for_unless_trusted_when_enabled() {
let instructions = DeveloperInstructions::from_permissions_with_network(
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite,
NetworkAccess::Enabled,
AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted,
&Policy::empty(),
None,
false,
true,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
assert!(text.contains("`approval_policy` is `unless-trusted`"));
assert!(text.contains("# request_permissions Tool"));
}
#[test]
fn includes_request_permissions_tool_instructions_for_on_failure_when_enabled() {
let instructions = DeveloperInstructions::from_permissions_with_network(
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite,
NetworkAccess::Enabled,
AskForApproval::OnFailure,
&Policy::empty(),
None,
false,
true,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
assert!(text.contains("`approval_policy` is `on-failure`"));
assert!(text.contains("# request_permissions Tool"));
}
#[test]
fn includes_request_permission_rule_instructions_for_on_request_when_enabled() {
let instructions = DeveloperInstructions::from_permissions_with_network(
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite,
NetworkAccess::Enabled,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&Policy::empty(),
None,
true,
false,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
assert!(text.contains("with_additional_permissions"));
assert!(text.contains("additional_permissions"));
}
#[test]
fn includes_request_permissions_tool_instructions_for_on_request_when_tool_is_enabled() {
let instructions = DeveloperInstructions::from_permissions_with_network(
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite,
NetworkAccess::Enabled,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&Policy::empty(),
None,
false,
true,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
assert!(text.contains("# request_permissions Tool"));
assert!(
text.contains("The built-in `request_permissions` tool is available in this session.")
);
}
#[test]
fn on_request_includes_tool_guidance_alongside_inline_permission_guidance_when_both_exist() {
let instructions = DeveloperInstructions::from_permissions_with_network(
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite,
NetworkAccess::Enabled,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&Policy::empty(),
None,
true,
true,
);
let text = instructions.into_text();
assert!(text.contains("with_additional_permissions"));
assert!(text.contains("# request_permissions Tool"));
}
fn granular_categories_section(title: &str, categories: &[&str]) -> String {
format!("{title}\n{}", categories.join("\n"))
}
fn granular_prompt_expected(
prompted_categories: &[&str],
rejected_categories: &[&str],
include_shell_permission_request_instructions: bool,
include_request_permissions_tool_section: bool,
) -> String {
let mut sections = vec![granular_prompt_intro_text().to_string()];
if !prompted_categories.is_empty() {
sections.push(granular_categories_section(
"These approval categories may still prompt the user when needed:",
prompted_categories,
));
}
if !rejected_categories.is_empty() {
sections.push(granular_categories_section(
"These approval categories are automatically rejected instead of prompting the user:",
rejected_categories,
));
}
if include_shell_permission_request_instructions {
sections.push(APPROVAL_POLICY_ON_REQUEST_RULE_REQUEST_PERMISSION.to_string());
}
if include_request_permissions_tool_section {
sections.push(request_permissions_tool_prompt_section().to_string());
}
sections.join("\n\n")
}
#[test]
fn granular_policy_lists_prompted_and_rejected_categories_separately() {
let text = DeveloperInstructions::from(
AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: false,
rules: true,
skill_approval: false,
request_permissions: true,
mcp_elicitations: false,
}),
&Policy::empty(),
true,
false,
)
.into_text();
assert_eq!(
text,
[
granular_prompt_intro_text().to_string(),
granular_categories_section(
"These approval categories may still prompt the user when needed:",
&["- `rules`"],
),
granular_categories_section(
"These approval categories are automatically rejected instead of prompting the user:",
&["- `sandbox_approval`", "- `skill_approval`", "- `mcp_elicitations`",],
),
]
.join("\n\n")
);
}
#[test]
fn granular_policy_includes_command_permission_instructions_when_sandbox_approval_can_prompt() {
let text = DeveloperInstructions::from(
AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: true,
rules: true,
skill_approval: true,
request_permissions: true,
mcp_elicitations: true,
}),
&Policy::empty(),
true,
false,
)
.into_text();
assert_eq!(
text,
granular_prompt_expected(
&[
"- `sandbox_approval`",
"- `rules`",
"- `skill_approval`",
"- `mcp_elicitations`",
],
&[],
true,
false,
)
);
}
#[test]
fn granular_policy_omits_shell_permission_instructions_when_inline_requests_are_disabled() {
let text = DeveloperInstructions::from(
AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: true,
rules: true,
skill_approval: true,
request_permissions: true,
mcp_elicitations: true,
}),
&Policy::empty(),
false,
false,
)
.into_text();
assert_eq!(
text,
granular_prompt_expected(
&[
"- `sandbox_approval`",
"- `rules`",
"- `skill_approval`",
"- `mcp_elicitations`",
],
&[],
false,
false,
)
);
}
#[test]
fn granular_policy_includes_request_permissions_tool_only_when_that_prompt_can_still_fire() {
let allowed = DeveloperInstructions::from(
AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: true,
rules: true,
skill_approval: true,
request_permissions: true,
mcp_elicitations: true,
}),
&Policy::empty(),
true,
true,
)
.into_text();
assert!(allowed.contains("# request_permissions Tool"));
let rejected = DeveloperInstructions::from(
AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: true,
rules: true,
skill_approval: true,
request_permissions: false,
mcp_elicitations: true,
}),
&Policy::empty(),
true,
true,
)
.into_text();
assert!(!rejected.contains("# request_permissions Tool"));
}
#[test]
fn granular_policy_lists_request_permissions_category_without_tool_section_when_tool_is_unavailable()
{
let text = DeveloperInstructions::from(
AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: false,
rules: false,
skill_approval: false,
request_permissions: true,
mcp_elicitations: false,
}),
&Policy::empty(),
true,
false,
)
.into_text();
assert!(!text.contains("- `request_permissions`"));
assert!(!text.contains("# request_permissions Tool"));
}
#[test]
fn render_command_prefix_list_sorts_by_len_then_total_len_then_alphabetical() {
let prefixes = vec![
vec!["b".to_string(), "zz".to_string()],
vec!["aa".to_string()],
vec!["b".to_string()],
vec!["a".to_string(), "b".to_string(), "c".to_string()],
vec!["a".to_string()],
vec!["b".to_string(), "a".to_string()],
];
let output = format_allow_prefixes(prefixes).expect("rendered list");
assert_eq!(
output,
r#"- ["a"]
- ["b"]
- ["aa"]
- ["b", "a"]
- ["b", "zz"]
- ["a", "b", "c"]"#
.to_string(),
);
}
#[test]
fn render_command_prefix_list_limits_output_to_max_prefixes() {
let prefixes = (0..(MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES + 5))
.map(|i| vec![format!("{i:03}")])
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let output = format_allow_prefixes(prefixes).expect("rendered list");
assert_eq!(output.ends_with(TRUNCATED_MARKER), true);
eprintln!("output: {output}");
assert_eq!(output.lines().count(), MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES + 1);
}
#[test]
fn format_allow_prefixes_limits_output() {
let mut exec_policy = Policy::empty();
for i in 0..200 {
exec_policy
.add_prefix_rule(
&[format!("tool-{i:03}"), "x".repeat(500)],
codex_execpolicy::Decision::Allow,
)
.expect("add rule");
}
let output =
format_allow_prefixes(exec_policy.get_allowed_prefixes()).expect("formatted prefixes");
assert!(
output.len() <= MAX_ALLOW_PREFIX_TEXT_BYTES + TRUNCATED_MARKER.len(),
"output length exceeds expected limit: {output}",
);
}
#[test]
fn serializes_success_as_plain_string() -> Result<()> {
let item = ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: "call1".into(),
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload::from_text("ok".into()),
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&item)?;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json)?;
// Success case -> output should be a plain string
assert_eq!(v.get("output").unwrap().as_str().unwrap(), "ok");
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn serializes_failure_as_string() -> Result<()> {
let item = ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: "call1".into(),
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text("bad".into()),
success: Some(false),
},
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&item)?;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json)?;
assert_eq!(v.get("output").unwrap().as_str().unwrap(), "bad");
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn serializes_image_outputs_as_array() -> Result<()> {
let call_tool_result = CallToolResult {
content: vec![
serde_json::json!({"type":"text","text":"caption"}),
serde_json::json!({"type":"image","data":"BASE64","mimeType":"image/png"}),
],
structured_content: None,
is_error: Some(false),
meta: None,
};
let payload = call_tool_result.into_function_call_output_payload();
assert_eq!(payload.success, Some(true));
let Some(items) = payload.content_items() else {
panic!("expected content items");
};
let items = items.to_vec();
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "caption".into(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: None,
},
]
);
let item = ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: "call1".into(),
output: payload,
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&item)?;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json)?;
let output = v.get("output").expect("output field");
assert!(output.is_array(), "expected array output");
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn serializes_custom_tool_image_outputs_as_array() -> Result<()> {
let item = ResponseInputItem::CustomToolCallOutput {
call_id: "call1".into(),
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload::from_content_items(vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: None,
},
]),
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&item)?;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json)?;
let output = v.get("output").expect("output field");
assert!(output.is_array(), "expected array output");
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn preserves_existing_image_data_urls() -> Result<()> {
let call_tool_result = CallToolResult {
content: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "image",
"data": "",
"mimeType": "image/png"
})],
structured_content: None,
is_error: Some(false),
meta: None,
};
let payload = call_tool_result.into_function_call_output_payload();
let Some(items) = payload.content_items() else {
panic!("expected content items");
};
let items = items.to_vec();
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: None,
}]
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn deserializes_array_payload_into_items() -> Result<()> {
let json = r#"[
{"type": "input_text", "text": "note"},
{"type": "input_image", "image_url": ""}
]"#;
let payload: FunctionCallOutputPayload = serde_json::from_str(json)?;
assert_eq!(payload.success, None);
let expected_items = vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "note".into(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: None,
},
];
assert_eq!(
payload.body,
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(expected_items.clone())
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_string(&payload)?,
serde_json::to_string(&expected_items)?
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn deserializes_compaction_alias() -> Result<()> {
let json = r#"{"type":"compaction_summary","encrypted_content":"abc"}"#;
let item: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(json)?;
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::Compaction {
encrypted_content: "abc".into(),
}
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn roundtrips_web_search_call_actions() -> Result<()> {
let cases = vec![
(
r#"{
"type": "web_search_call",
"status": "completed",
"action": {
"type": "search",
"query": "weather seattle",
"queries": ["weather seattle", "seattle weather now"]
}
}"#,
None,
Some(WebSearchAction::Search {
query: Some("weather seattle".into()),
queries: Some(vec!["weather seattle".into(), "seattle weather now".into()]),
}),
Some("completed".into()),
true,
),
(
r#"{
"type": "web_search_call",
"status": "open",
"action": {
"type": "open_page",
"url": "https://example.com"
}
}"#,
None,
Some(WebSearchAction::OpenPage {
url: Some("https://example.com".into()),
}),
Some("open".into()),
true,
),
(
r#"{
"type": "web_search_call",
"status": "in_progress",
"action": {
"type": "find_in_page",
"url": "https://example.com/docs",
"pattern": "installation"
}
}"#,
None,
Some(WebSearchAction::FindInPage {
url: Some("https://example.com/docs".into()),
pattern: Some("installation".into()),
}),
Some("in_progress".into()),
true,
),
(
r#"{
"type": "web_search_call",
"status": "in_progress",
"id": "ws_partial"
}"#,
Some("ws_partial".into()),
None,
Some("in_progress".into()),
false,
),
];
for (json_literal, expected_id, expected_action, expected_status, expect_roundtrip) in cases
{
let parsed: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(json_literal)?;
let expected = ResponseItem::WebSearchCall {
id: expected_id.clone(),
status: expected_status.clone(),
action: expected_action.clone(),
};
assert_eq!(parsed, expected);
let serialized = serde_json::to_value(&parsed)?;
let mut expected_serialized: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(json_literal)?;
if !expect_roundtrip && let Some(obj) = expected_serialized.as_object_mut() {
obj.remove("id");
}
assert_eq!(serialized, expected_serialized);
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn deserialize_shell_tool_call_params() -> Result<()> {
let json = r#"{
"command": ["ls", "-l"],
"workdir": "/tmp",
"timeout": 1000
}"#;
let params: ShellToolCallParams = serde_json::from_str(json)?;
assert_eq!(
ShellToolCallParams {
command: vec!["ls".to_string(), "-l".to_string()],
workdir: Some("/tmp".to_string()),
timeout_ms: Some(1000),
sandbox_permissions: None,
prefix_rule: None,
additional_permissions: None,
justification: None,
},
params
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn wraps_image_user_input_with_tags() -> Result<()> {
let image_url = "".to_string();
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![UserInput::Image {
image_url: image_url.clone(),
}]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
let expected = vec![
ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_open_tag_text(),
},
ContentItem::InputImage { image_url },
ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_close_tag_text(),
},
];
assert_eq!(content, expected);
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn tool_search_call_roundtrips() -> Result<()> {
let parsed: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(
r#"{
"type": "tool_search_call",
"call_id": "search-1",
"execution": "client",
"arguments": {
"query": "calendar create",
"limit": 1
}
}"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(
parsed,
ResponseItem::ToolSearchCall {
id: None,
call_id: Some("search-1".to_string()),
status: None,
execution: "client".to_string(),
arguments: serde_json::json!({
"query": "calendar create",
"limit": 1,
}),
}
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(&parsed)?,
serde_json::json!({
"type": "tool_search_call",
"call_id": "search-1",
"execution": "client",
"arguments": {
"query": "calendar create",
"limit": 1,
}
})
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn tool_search_output_roundtrips() -> Result<()> {
let input = ResponseInputItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: "search-1".to_string(),
status: "completed".to_string(),
execution: "client".to_string(),
tools: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "function",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__calendar_create_event",
"description": "Create a calendar event.",
"defer_loading": true,
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"title": {"type": "string"}
},
"required": ["title"],
"additionalProperties": false,
}
})],
};
assert_eq!(
ResponseItem::from(input.clone()),
ResponseItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: Some("search-1".to_string()),
status: "completed".to_string(),
execution: "client".to_string(),
tools: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "function",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__calendar_create_event",
"description": "Create a calendar event.",
"defer_loading": true,
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"title": {"type": "string"}
},
"required": ["title"],
"additionalProperties": false,
}
})],
}
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(input)?,
serde_json::json!({
"type": "tool_search_output",
"call_id": "search-1",
"status": "completed",
"execution": "client",
"tools": [{
"type": "function",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__calendar_create_event",
"description": "Create a calendar event.",
"defer_loading": true,
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"title": {"type": "string"}
},
"required": ["title"],
"additionalProperties": false,
}
}]
})
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn tool_search_server_items_allow_null_call_id() -> Result<()> {
let parsed_call: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(
r#"{
"type": "tool_search_call",
"execution": "server",
"call_id": null,
"status": "completed",
"arguments": {
"paths": ["crm"]
}
}"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(
parsed_call,
ResponseItem::ToolSearchCall {
id: None,
call_id: None,
status: Some("completed".to_string()),
execution: "server".to_string(),
arguments: serde_json::json!({
"paths": ["crm"],
}),
}
);
let parsed_output: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(
r#"{
"type": "tool_search_output",
"execution": "server",
"call_id": null,
"status": "completed",
"tools": []
}"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(
parsed_output,
ResponseItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: None,
status: "completed".to_string(),
execution: "server".to_string(),
tools: vec![],
}
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn mixed_remote_and_local_images_share_label_sequence() -> Result<()> {
let image_url = "".to_string();
let dir = tempdir()?;
let local_path = dir.path().join("local.png");
// A tiny valid PNG (1x1) so this test doesn't depend on cross-crate file paths, which
// break under Bazel sandboxing.
const TINY_PNG_BYTES: &[u8] = &[
137, 80, 78, 71, 13, 10, 26, 10, 0, 0, 0, 13, 73, 72, 68, 82, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1,
8, 6, 0, 0, 0, 31, 21, 196, 137, 0, 0, 0, 11, 73, 68, 65, 84, 120, 156, 99, 96, 0, 2,
0, 0, 5, 0, 1, 122, 94, 171, 63, 0, 0, 0, 0, 73, 69, 78, 68, 174, 66, 96, 130,
];
std::fs::write(&local_path, TINY_PNG_BYTES)?;
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![
UserInput::Image {
image_url: image_url.clone(),
},
UserInput::LocalImage { path: local_path },
]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
assert_eq!(
content.first(),
Some(&ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_open_tag_text(),
})
);
assert_eq!(content.get(1), Some(&ContentItem::InputImage { image_url }));
assert_eq!(
content.get(2),
Some(&ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_close_tag_text(),
})
);
assert_eq!(
content.get(3),
Some(&ContentItem::InputText {
text: local_image_open_tag_text(2),
})
);
assert!(matches!(
content.get(4),
Some(ContentItem::InputImage { .. })
));
assert_eq!(
content.get(5),
Some(&ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_close_tag_text(),
})
);
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn local_image_read_error_adds_placeholder() -> Result<()> {
let dir = tempdir()?;
let missing_path = dir.path().join("missing-image.png");
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![UserInput::LocalImage {
path: missing_path.clone(),
}]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
assert_eq!(content.len(), 1);
match &content[0] {
ContentItem::InputText { text } => {
let display_path = missing_path.display().to_string();
assert!(
text.contains(&display_path),
"placeholder should mention missing path: {text}"
);
assert!(
text.contains("could not read"),
"placeholder should mention read issue: {text}"
);
}
other => panic!("expected placeholder text but found {other:?}"),
}
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn local_image_non_image_adds_placeholder() -> Result<()> {
let dir = tempdir()?;
let json_path = dir.path().join("example.json");
std::fs::write(&json_path, br#"{"hello":"world"}"#)?;
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![UserInput::LocalImage {
path: json_path.clone(),
}]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
assert_eq!(content.len(), 1);
match &content[0] {
ContentItem::InputText { text } => {
assert!(
text.contains("unsupported MIME type `application/json`"),
"placeholder should mention unsupported MIME: {text}"
);
assert!(
text.contains(&json_path.display().to_string()),
"placeholder should mention path: {text}"
);
}
other => panic!("expected placeholder text but found {other:?}"),
}
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn local_image_unsupported_image_format_adds_placeholder() -> Result<()> {
let dir = tempdir()?;
let svg_path = dir.path().join("example.svg");
std::fs::write(
&svg_path,
br#"<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1" height="1"></svg>"#,
)?;
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![UserInput::LocalImage {
path: svg_path.clone(),
}]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
assert_eq!(content.len(), 1);
let expected = format!(
"Codex cannot attach image at `{}`: unsupported image format `image/svg+xml`.",
svg_path.display()
);
match &content[0] {
ContentItem::InputText { text } => assert_eq!(text, &expected),
other => panic!("expected placeholder text but found {other:?}"),
}
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
}
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