core-agent-ide/codex-rs/linux-sandbox
Celia Chen b6d20748e0
Revert "Ensure shell command skills trigger approval (#12697)" (#12721)
This reverts commit daf0f03ac8.

# External (non-OpenAI) Pull Request Requirements

Before opening this Pull Request, please read the dedicated
"Contributing" markdown file or your PR may be closed:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/docs/contributing.md

If your PR conforms to our contribution guidelines, replace this text
with a detailed and high quality description of your changes.

Include a link to a bug report or enhancement request.
2026-02-25 22:49:53 +00:00
..
src feat(linux-sandbox): implement proxy-only egress via TCP-UDS-TCP bridge (#11293) 2026-02-21 18:16:34 +00:00
tests Revert "Ensure shell command skills trigger approval (#12697)" (#12721) 2026-02-25 22:49:53 +00:00
BUILD.bazel build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498) 2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00
build.rs build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498) 2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00
Cargo.toml feat(linux-sandbox): implement proxy-only egress via TCP-UDS-TCP bridge (#11293) 2026-02-21 18:16:34 +00:00
config.h build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498) 2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00
README.md feat(linux-sandbox): implement proxy-only egress via TCP-UDS-TCP bridge (#11293) 2026-02-21 18:16:34 +00:00

codex-linux-sandbox

This crate is responsible for producing:

  • a codex-linux-sandbox standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
  • a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as run_main() so that
    • the codex-exec CLI can check if its arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox and, if so, execute as if it were codex-linux-sandbox
    • this should also be true of the codex multitool CLI

On Linux, the bubblewrap pipeline uses the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into this binary.

Current Behavior

  • Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as the legacy pipeline.
  • The bubblewrap pipeline is standardized on the vendored path.
  • During rollout, the bubblewrap pipeline is gated by the temporary feature flag use_linux_sandbox_bwrap (CLI -c alias for features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap; legacy remains default when off).
  • When enabled, the bubblewrap pipeline applies PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and a seccomp network filter in-process.
  • When enabled, the filesystem is read-only by default via --ro-bind / /.
  • When enabled, writable roots are layered with --bind <root> <root>.
  • When enabled, protected subpaths under writable roots (for example .git, resolved gitdir:, and .codex) are re-applied as read-only via --ro-bind.
  • When enabled, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside writable roots are blocked by mounting /dev/null on the symlink or first missing component.
  • When enabled, the helper isolates the PID namespace via --unshare-pid.
  • When enabled and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also isolates the network namespace via --unshare-net.
  • In managed proxy mode, the helper uses --unshare-net plus an internal TCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxy endpoints.
  • In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.
  • When enabled, it mounts a fresh /proc via --proc /proc by default, but you can skip this in restrictive container environments with --no-proc.

Notes

  • The CLI surface still uses legacy names like codex debug landlock.