core-agent-ide/codex-rs/network-proxy/src/state.rs
viyatb-oai 25fa974166
fix: support managed network allowlist controls (#12752)
## Summary
- treat `requirements.toml` `allowed_domains` and `denied_domains` as
managed network baselines for the proxy
- in restricted modes by default, build the effective runtime policy
from the managed baseline plus user-configured allowlist and denylist
entries, so common hosts can be pre-approved without blocking later user
expansion
- add `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` to pin
the effective allowlist to managed entries, ignore user allowlist
additions, and hard-deny non-managed domains without prompting
- apply `managed_allowed_domains_only` anywhere managed network
enforcement is active, including full access, while continuing to
respect denied domains from all sources
- add regression coverage for merged-baseline behavior, managed-only
behavior, and full-access managed-only enforcement

## Behavior
Assuming `requirements.toml` defines both
`experimental_network.allowed_domains` and
`experimental_network.denied_domains`.

### Default mode
- By default, the effective allowlist is
`experimental_network.allowed_domains` plus user or persisted allowlist
additions.
- By default, the effective denylist is
`experimental_network.denied_domains` plus user or persisted denylist
additions.
- Allowlist misses can go through the network approval flow.
- Explicit denylist hits and local or private-network blocks are still
hard-denied.
- When `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true`, only
managed `allowed_domains` are respected, user allowlist additions are
ignored, and non-managed domains are hard-denied without prompting.
- Denied domains continue to be respected from all sources.

### Full access
- With managed requirements present, the effective allowlist is pinned
to `experimental_network.allowed_domains`.
- With managed requirements present, the effective denylist is pinned to
`experimental_network.denied_domains`.
- There is no allowlist-miss approval path in full access.
- Explicit denylist hits are hard-denied.
- `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` now also
applies in full access, so managed-only behavior remains in effect
anywhere managed network enforcement is active.
2026-03-06 17:52:54 -08:00

406 lines
14 KiB
Rust

use crate::config::NetworkMode;
use crate::config::NetworkProxyConfig;
use crate::mitm::MitmState;
use crate::policy::DomainPattern;
use crate::policy::compile_globset;
use crate::policy::is_global_wildcard_domain_pattern;
use crate::runtime::ConfigState;
use serde::Deserialize;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::sync::Arc;
pub use crate::runtime::BlockedRequest;
pub use crate::runtime::BlockedRequestArgs;
pub use crate::runtime::NetworkProxyAuditMetadata;
pub use crate::runtime::NetworkProxyState;
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) use crate::runtime::network_proxy_state_for_policy;
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NetworkProxyConstraints {
pub enabled: Option<bool>,
pub mode: Option<NetworkMode>,
pub allow_upstream_proxy: Option<bool>,
pub dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy: Option<bool>,
pub dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets: Option<bool>,
pub allowed_domains: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub allowlist_expansion_enabled: Option<bool>,
pub denied_domains: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub denylist_expansion_enabled: Option<bool>,
pub allow_unix_sockets: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub allow_local_binding: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
pub struct PartialNetworkProxyConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub network: PartialNetworkConfig,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Deserialize)]
pub struct PartialNetworkConfig {
pub enabled: Option<bool>,
pub mode: Option<NetworkMode>,
pub allow_upstream_proxy: Option<bool>,
pub dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy: Option<bool>,
pub dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets: Option<bool>,
#[serde(default)]
pub allowed_domains: Option<Vec<String>>,
#[serde(default)]
pub denied_domains: Option<Vec<String>>,
#[serde(default)]
pub allow_unix_sockets: Option<Vec<String>>,
#[serde(default)]
pub allow_local_binding: Option<bool>,
}
pub fn build_config_state(
config: NetworkProxyConfig,
constraints: NetworkProxyConstraints,
) -> anyhow::Result<ConfigState> {
crate::config::validate_unix_socket_allowlist_paths(&config)?;
validate_domain_patterns("network.allowed_domains", &config.network.allowed_domains)
.map_err(NetworkProxyConstraintError::into_anyhow)?;
validate_domain_patterns("network.denied_domains", &config.network.denied_domains)
.map_err(NetworkProxyConstraintError::into_anyhow)?;
let deny_set = compile_globset(&config.network.denied_domains)?;
let allow_set = compile_globset(&config.network.allowed_domains)?;
let mitm = if config.network.mitm {
Some(Arc::new(MitmState::new(
config.network.allow_upstream_proxy,
)?))
} else {
None
};
Ok(ConfigState {
config,
allow_set,
deny_set,
mitm,
constraints,
blocked: std::collections::VecDeque::new(),
blocked_total: 0,
})
}
pub fn validate_policy_against_constraints(
config: &NetworkProxyConfig,
constraints: &NetworkProxyConstraints,
) -> Result<(), NetworkProxyConstraintError> {
fn invalid_value(
field_name: &'static str,
candidate: impl Into<String>,
allowed: impl Into<String>,
) -> NetworkProxyConstraintError {
NetworkProxyConstraintError::InvalidValue {
field_name,
candidate: candidate.into(),
allowed: allowed.into(),
}
}
fn validate<T>(
candidate: T,
validator: impl FnOnce(&T) -> Result<(), NetworkProxyConstraintError>,
) -> Result<(), NetworkProxyConstraintError> {
validator(&candidate)
}
let enabled = config.network.enabled;
validate_domain_patterns("network.allowed_domains", &config.network.allowed_domains)?;
validate_domain_patterns("network.denied_domains", &config.network.denied_domains)?;
if let Some(max_enabled) = constraints.enabled {
validate(enabled, move |candidate| {
if *candidate && !max_enabled {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.enabled",
"true",
"false (disabled by managed config)",
))
} else {
Ok(())
}
})?;
}
if let Some(max_mode) = constraints.mode {
validate(config.network.mode, move |candidate| {
if network_mode_rank(*candidate) > network_mode_rank(max_mode) {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.mode",
format!("{candidate:?}"),
format!("{max_mode:?} or more restrictive"),
))
} else {
Ok(())
}
})?;
}
let allow_upstream_proxy = constraints.allow_upstream_proxy;
validate(
config.network.allow_upstream_proxy,
move |candidate| match allow_upstream_proxy {
Some(true) | None => Ok(()),
Some(false) => {
if *candidate {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.allow_upstream_proxy",
"true",
"false (disabled by managed config)",
))
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
},
)?;
let allow_non_loopback_proxy = constraints.dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy;
validate(
config.network.dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy,
move |candidate| match allow_non_loopback_proxy {
Some(true) | None => Ok(()),
Some(false) => {
if *candidate {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy",
"true",
"false (disabled by managed config)",
))
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
},
)?;
let allow_all_unix_sockets = constraints
.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets
.unwrap_or(constraints.allow_unix_sockets.is_none());
validate(
config.network.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets,
move |candidate| {
if *candidate && !allow_all_unix_sockets {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets",
"true",
"false (disabled by managed config)",
))
} else {
Ok(())
}
},
)?;
if let Some(allow_local_binding) = constraints.allow_local_binding {
validate(config.network.allow_local_binding, move |candidate| {
if *candidate && !allow_local_binding {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.allow_local_binding",
"true",
"false (disabled by managed config)",
))
} else {
Ok(())
}
})?;
}
if let Some(allowed_domains) = &constraints.allowed_domains {
validate_domain_patterns("network.allowed_domains", allowed_domains)?;
match constraints.allowlist_expansion_enabled {
Some(true) => {
let required_set: HashSet<String> = allowed_domains
.iter()
.map(|entry| entry.to_ascii_lowercase())
.collect();
validate(config.network.allowed_domains.clone(), move |candidate| {
let candidate_set: HashSet<String> = candidate
.iter()
.map(|entry| entry.to_ascii_lowercase())
.collect();
let missing: Vec<String> = required_set
.iter()
.filter(|entry| !candidate_set.contains(*entry))
.cloned()
.collect();
if missing.is_empty() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.allowed_domains",
"missing managed allowed_domains entries",
format!("{missing:?}"),
))
}
})?;
}
Some(false) => {
let required_set: HashSet<String> = allowed_domains
.iter()
.map(|entry| entry.to_ascii_lowercase())
.collect();
validate(config.network.allowed_domains.clone(), move |candidate| {
let candidate_set: HashSet<String> = candidate
.iter()
.map(|entry| entry.to_ascii_lowercase())
.collect();
if candidate_set == required_set {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.allowed_domains",
format!("{candidate:?}"),
"must match managed allowed_domains",
))
}
})?;
}
None => {
let managed_patterns: Vec<DomainPattern> = allowed_domains
.iter()
.map(|entry| DomainPattern::parse_for_constraints(entry))
.collect();
validate(config.network.allowed_domains.clone(), move |candidate| {
let mut invalid = Vec::new();
for entry in candidate {
let candidate_pattern = DomainPattern::parse_for_constraints(entry);
if !managed_patterns
.iter()
.any(|managed| managed.allows(&candidate_pattern))
{
invalid.push(entry.clone());
}
}
if invalid.is_empty() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.allowed_domains",
format!("{invalid:?}"),
"subset of managed allowed_domains",
))
}
})?;
}
}
}
if let Some(denied_domains) = &constraints.denied_domains {
validate_domain_patterns("network.denied_domains", denied_domains)?;
let required_set: HashSet<String> = denied_domains
.iter()
.map(|s| s.to_ascii_lowercase())
.collect();
match constraints.denylist_expansion_enabled {
Some(false) => {
validate(config.network.denied_domains.clone(), move |candidate| {
let candidate_set: HashSet<String> = candidate
.iter()
.map(|entry| entry.to_ascii_lowercase())
.collect();
if candidate_set == required_set {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.denied_domains",
format!("{candidate:?}"),
"must match managed denied_domains",
))
}
})?;
}
Some(true) | None => {
validate(config.network.denied_domains.clone(), move |candidate| {
let candidate_set: HashSet<String> =
candidate.iter().map(|s| s.to_ascii_lowercase()).collect();
let missing: Vec<String> = required_set
.iter()
.filter(|entry| !candidate_set.contains(*entry))
.cloned()
.collect();
if missing.is_empty() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.denied_domains",
"missing managed denied_domains entries",
format!("{missing:?}"),
))
}
})?;
}
}
}
if let Some(allow_unix_sockets) = &constraints.allow_unix_sockets {
let allowed_set: HashSet<String> = allow_unix_sockets
.iter()
.map(|s| s.to_ascii_lowercase())
.collect();
validate(
config.network.allow_unix_sockets.clone(),
move |candidate| {
let mut invalid = Vec::new();
for entry in candidate {
if !allowed_set.contains(&entry.to_ascii_lowercase()) {
invalid.push(entry.clone());
}
}
if invalid.is_empty() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(invalid_value(
"network.allow_unix_sockets",
format!("{invalid:?}"),
"subset of managed allow_unix_sockets",
))
}
},
)?;
}
Ok(())
}
fn validate_domain_patterns(
field_name: &'static str,
patterns: &[String],
) -> Result<(), NetworkProxyConstraintError> {
if let Some(pattern) = patterns
.iter()
.find(|pattern| is_global_wildcard_domain_pattern(pattern))
{
return Err(NetworkProxyConstraintError::InvalidValue {
field_name,
candidate: pattern.trim().to_string(),
allowed: "exact hosts or scoped wildcards like *.example.com or **.example.com"
.to_string(),
});
}
Ok(())
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum NetworkProxyConstraintError {
#[error("invalid value for {field_name}: {candidate} (allowed {allowed})")]
InvalidValue {
field_name: &'static str,
candidate: String,
allowed: String,
},
}
impl NetworkProxyConstraintError {
pub fn into_anyhow(self) -> anyhow::Error {
anyhow::anyhow!(self)
}
}
fn network_mode_rank(mode: NetworkMode) -> u8 {
match mode {
NetworkMode::Limited => 0,
NetworkMode::Full => 1,
}
}