core-agent-ide/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs
Michael Bolin abbd74e2be
feat: make sandbox read access configurable with ReadOnlyAccess (#11387)
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` previously implied broad read access and could
not express a narrower read surface.
This change introduces an explicit read-access model so we can support
user-configurable read restrictions in follow-up work, while preserving
current behavior today.

It also ensures unsupported backends fail closed for restricted-read
policies instead of silently granting broader access than intended.

## What

- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` in protocol with:
  - `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
  - `FullAccess`
- Updated `SandboxPolicy` to carry read-access configuration:
  - `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
  - `WorkspaceWrite { ..., read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- Preserved existing behavior by defaulting current construction paths
to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`.
- Threaded the new fields through sandbox policy consumers and call
sites across `core`, `tui`, `linux-sandbox`, `windows-sandbox`, and
related tests.
- Updated Seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by
emitting scoped read rules when full read access is not granted.
- Added fail-closed behavior on Linux and Windows backends when
restricted read access is requested but not yet implemented there
(`UnsupportedOperation`).
- Regenerated app-server protocol schema and TypeScript artifacts,
including `ReadOnlyAccess`.

## Compatibility / rollout

- Runtime behavior remains unchanged by default (`FullAccess`).
- API/schema changes are in place so future config wiring can enable
restricted read access without another policy-shape migration.
2026-02-11 18:31:14 -08:00

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#![cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
use codex_core::config::types::ShellEnvironmentPolicy;
use codex_core::error::CodexErr;
use codex_core::error::Result;
use codex_core::error::SandboxErr;
use codex_core::exec::ExecParams;
use codex_core::exec::process_exec_tool_call;
use codex_core::exec_env::create_env;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_core::protocol_config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_core::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tempfile::NamedTempFile;
// At least on GitHub CI, the arm64 tests appear to need longer timeouts.
#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))]
const SHORT_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 200;
#[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")]
const SHORT_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 5_000;
#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))]
const LONG_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 1_000;
#[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")]
const LONG_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 5_000;
#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))]
const NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 2_000;
#[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")]
const NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10_000;
const BWRAP_UNAVAILABLE_ERR: &str = "build-time bubblewrap is not available in this build.";
fn create_env_from_core_vars() -> HashMap<String, String> {
let policy = ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default();
create_env(&policy, None)
}
#[expect(clippy::print_stdout)]
async fn run_cmd(cmd: &[&str], writable_roots: &[PathBuf], timeout_ms: u64) {
let output = run_cmd_output(cmd, writable_roots, timeout_ms).await;
if output.exit_code != 0 {
println!("stdout:\n{}", output.stdout.text);
println!("stderr:\n{}", output.stderr.text);
panic!("exit code: {}", output.exit_code);
}
}
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
async fn run_cmd_output(
cmd: &[&str],
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
timeout_ms: u64,
) -> codex_core::exec::ExecToolCallOutput {
run_cmd_result_with_writable_roots(cmd, writable_roots, timeout_ms, false)
.await
.expect("sandboxed command should execute")
}
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
async fn run_cmd_result_with_writable_roots(
cmd: &[&str],
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
timeout_ms: u64,
use_bwrap_sandbox: bool,
) -> Result<codex_core::exec::ExecToolCallOutput> {
let cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd should exist");
let sandbox_cwd = cwd.clone();
let params = ExecParams {
command: cmd.iter().copied().map(str::to_owned).collect(),
cwd,
expiration: timeout_ms.into(),
env: create_env_from_core_vars(),
network: None,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
justification: None,
arg0: None,
};
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: writable_roots
.iter()
.map(|p| AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(p.as_path()).unwrap())
.collect(),
read_only_access: Default::default(),
network_access: false,
// Exclude tmp-related folders from writable roots because we need a
// folder that is writable by tests but that we intentionally disallow
// writing to in the sandbox.
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let sandbox_program = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox");
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = Some(PathBuf::from(sandbox_program));
process_exec_tool_call(
params,
&sandbox_policy,
sandbox_cwd.as_path(),
&codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
use_bwrap_sandbox,
None,
)
.await
}
fn is_bwrap_unavailable_output(output: &codex_core::exec::ExecToolCallOutput) -> bool {
output.stderr.text.contains(BWRAP_UNAVAILABLE_ERR)
}
async fn should_skip_bwrap_tests() -> bool {
match run_cmd_result_with_writable_roots(
&["bash", "-lc", "true"],
&[],
NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
true,
)
.await
{
Ok(output) => is_bwrap_unavailable_output(&output),
Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Denied { output })) => {
is_bwrap_unavailable_output(&output)
}
// Probe timeouts are not actionable for the bwrap-specific assertions below;
// skip rather than fail the whole suite.
Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Timeout { .. })) => true,
Err(err) => panic!("bwrap availability probe failed unexpectedly: {err:?}"),
}
}
fn expect_denied(
result: Result<codex_core::exec::ExecToolCallOutput>,
context: &str,
) -> codex_core::exec::ExecToolCallOutput {
match result {
Ok(output) => {
assert_ne!(output.exit_code, 0, "{context}: expected nonzero exit code");
output
}
Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Denied { output })) => *output,
Err(err) => panic!("{context}: {err:?}"),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_root_read() {
run_cmd(&["ls", "-l", "/bin"], &[], SHORT_TIMEOUT_MS).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[should_panic]
async fn test_root_write() {
let tmpfile = NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();
let tmpfile_path = tmpfile.path().to_string_lossy();
run_cmd(
&["bash", "-lc", &format!("echo blah > {tmpfile_path}")],
&[],
SHORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_dev_null_write() {
run_cmd(
&["bash", "-lc", "echo blah > /dev/null"],
&[],
// We have seen timeouts when running this test in CI on GitHub,
// so we are using a generous timeout until we can diagnose further.
LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_writable_root() {
let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let file_path = tmpdir.path().join("test");
run_cmd(
&[
"bash",
"-lc",
&format!("echo blah > {}", file_path.to_string_lossy()),
],
&[tmpdir.path().to_path_buf()],
// We have seen timeouts when running this test in CI on GitHub,
// so we are using a generous timeout until we can diagnose further.
LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_no_new_privs_is_enabled() {
let output = run_cmd_output(
&["bash", "-lc", "grep '^NoNewPrivs:' /proc/self/status"],
&[],
// We have seen timeouts when running this test in CI on GitHub,
// so we are using a generous timeout until we can diagnose further.
LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
let line = output
.stdout
.text
.lines()
.find(|line| line.starts_with("NoNewPrivs:"))
.unwrap_or("");
assert_eq!(line.trim(), "NoNewPrivs:\t1");
}
#[tokio::test]
#[should_panic(expected = "Sandbox(Timeout")]
async fn test_timeout() {
run_cmd(&["sleep", "2"], &[], 50).await;
}
/// Helper that runs `cmd` under the Linux sandbox and asserts that the command
/// does NOT succeed (i.e. returns a nonzero exit code) **unless** the binary
/// is missing in which case we silently treat it as an accepted skip so the
/// suite remains green on leaner CI images.
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
async fn assert_network_blocked(cmd: &[&str]) {
let cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd should exist");
let sandbox_cwd = cwd.clone();
let params = ExecParams {
command: cmd.iter().copied().map(str::to_owned).collect(),
cwd,
// Give the tool a generous 2-second timeout so even slow DNS timeouts
// do not stall the suite.
expiration: NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS.into(),
env: create_env_from_core_vars(),
network: None,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
justification: None,
arg0: None,
};
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_program = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox");
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<PathBuf> = Some(PathBuf::from(sandbox_program));
let result = process_exec_tool_call(
params,
&sandbox_policy,
sandbox_cwd.as_path(),
&codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
false,
None,
)
.await;
let output = match result {
Ok(output) => output,
Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Denied { output })) => *output,
_ => {
panic!("expected sandbox denied error, got: {result:?}");
}
};
dbg!(&output.stderr.text);
dbg!(&output.stdout.text);
dbg!(&output.exit_code);
// A completely missing binary exits with 127. Anything else should also
// be nonzero (EPERM from seccomp will usually bubble up as 1, 2, 13…)
// If—*and only if*—the command exits 0 we consider the sandbox breached.
if output.exit_code == 0 {
panic!(
"Network sandbox FAILED - {cmd:?} exited 0\nstdout:\n{}\nstderr:\n{}",
output.stdout.text, output.stderr.text
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_curl() {
assert_network_blocked(&["curl", "-I", "http://openai.com"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_wget() {
assert_network_blocked(&["wget", "-qO-", "http://openai.com"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_ping() {
// ICMP requires raw socket should be denied quickly with EPERM.
assert_network_blocked(&["ping", "-c", "1", "8.8.8.8"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_nc() {
// Zerolength connection attempt to localhost.
assert_network_blocked(&["nc", "-z", "127.0.0.1", "80"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_git_and_codex_writes_inside_writable_root() {
if should_skip_bwrap_tests().await {
eprintln!("skipping bwrap test: vendored bwrap was not built in this environment");
return;
}
let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let dot_git = tmpdir.path().join(".git");
let dot_codex = tmpdir.path().join(".codex");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dot_git).expect("create .git");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dot_codex).expect("create .codex");
let git_target = dot_git.join("config");
let codex_target = dot_codex.join("config.toml");
let git_output = expect_denied(
run_cmd_result_with_writable_roots(
&[
"bash",
"-lc",
&format!("echo denied > {}", git_target.to_string_lossy()),
],
&[tmpdir.path().to_path_buf()],
LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
true,
)
.await,
".git write should be denied under bubblewrap",
);
let codex_output = expect_denied(
run_cmd_result_with_writable_roots(
&[
"bash",
"-lc",
&format!("echo denied > {}", codex_target.to_string_lossy()),
],
&[tmpdir.path().to_path_buf()],
LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
true,
)
.await,
".codex write should be denied under bubblewrap",
);
assert_ne!(git_output.exit_code, 0);
assert_ne!(codex_output.exit_code, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_codex_symlink_replacement_attack() {
if should_skip_bwrap_tests().await {
eprintln!("skipping bwrap test: vendored bwrap was not built in this environment");
return;
}
use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let decoy = tmpdir.path().join("decoy-codex");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&decoy).expect("create decoy dir");
let dot_codex = tmpdir.path().join(".codex");
symlink(&decoy, &dot_codex).expect("create .codex symlink");
let codex_target = dot_codex.join("config.toml");
let codex_output = expect_denied(
run_cmd_result_with_writable_roots(
&[
"bash",
"-lc",
&format!("echo denied > {}", codex_target.to_string_lossy()),
],
&[tmpdir.path().to_path_buf()],
LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
true,
)
.await,
".codex symlink replacement should be denied",
);
assert_ne!(codex_output.exit_code, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_ssh() {
// Force ssh to attempt a real TCP connection but fail quickly. `BatchMode`
// avoids password prompts, and `ConnectTimeout` keeps the hang time low.
assert_network_blocked(&[
"ssh",
"-o",
"BatchMode=yes",
"-o",
"ConnectTimeout=1",
"github.com",
])
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_getent() {
assert_network_blocked(&["getent", "ahosts", "openai.com"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_dev_tcp_redirection() {
// This syntax is only supported by bash and zsh. We try bash first.
// Fallback generic socket attempt using /bin/sh with bashstyle /dev/tcp. Not
// all images ship bash, so we guard against 127 as well.
assert_network_blocked(&["bash", "-c", "echo hi > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/80"]).await;
}