fix(trust): enforce scoped repository defaults
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This commit is contained in:
Virgil 2026-03-30 10:42:05 +00:00
parent 86c68ad1c9
commit c9a7a6fb4b
5 changed files with 52 additions and 27 deletions

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@ -161,17 +161,17 @@ Severity is low: an attacker with read access to process memory already has full
access to the process. The Go runtime does not guarantee memory zeroing and
GC-managed runtimes inherently have this limitation.
### Finding F3: Empty ScopedRepos Bypasses Scope Check on Tier 2 (Medium) — Open
### Finding F3: Empty ScopedRepos Bypasses Scope Check on Tier 2 (Medium) — RESOLVED
In `policy.go`, the repo scope check is conditioned on `len(agent.ScopedRepos) > 0`.
A Tier 2 agent with empty `ScopedRepos` (nil or `[]string{}`) is treated as
unrestricted rather than as having no access. If an admin registers a Tier 2
agent without explicitly setting `ScopedRepos`, it gets access to all repositories
for repo-scoped capabilities (`repo.push`, `pr.create`, `pr.merge`, `secrets.read`).
In `policy.go`, repo-scoped capability access previously skipped checks when
`len(agent.ScopedRepos) == 0`.
A Tier 2 agent with empty `ScopedRepos` (nil or `[]string{}`) was previously treated as
unrestricted rather than as having no access.
Potential remediation: treat empty `ScopedRepos` as no access for Tier 2 agents,
requiring explicit `["*"]` or `["org/**"]` for unrestricted access. This is a
design decision with backward-compatibility implications.
Resolved by requiring an explicit scope for repo-scoped capabilities:
- `[]string{}` / `nil` now denies all repo-scoped access by default.
- `[]string{"*"}` grants unrestricted repo access.
- Pattern matching with `host-uk/*` and `host-uk/**` still applies as before.
### Finding F4: `go vet` Clean — Passed
@ -224,8 +224,6 @@ callers that need structured logs should wrap or replace the cleanup goroutine.
`crypt/chachapoly` into a single implementation.
- **Hardware key backends**: implement `HardwareKey` for PKCS#11 (via
`miekg/pkcs11` or `ThalesIgnite/crypto11`) and YubiKey (via `go-piv`).
- **Resolve Finding F3**: require explicit wildcard for unrestricted Tier 2
access; treat empty `ScopedRepos` as no-access.
- **Structured logging**: replace `fmt.Printf` in `StartCleanup` with an
`slog.Logger` option on `Authenticator`.
- **Rate limiting enforcement**: the `Agent.RateLimit` field is stored in the

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@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ func (pe *PolicyEngine) Evaluate(agentName string, cap Capability, repo string)
// Check if capability is allowed.
for _, allowed := range policy.Allowed {
if allowed == cap {
// For repo-scoped capabilities, verify repo access.
if isRepoScoped(cap) && len(agent.ScopedRepos) > 0 {
if !repoAllowed(agent.ScopedRepos, repo) {
// For repo-scoped capabilities, verify repo access for restricted tiers.
if isRepoScoped(cap) && agent.Tier != TierFull {
if len(agent.ScopedRepos) == 0 || !repoAllowed(agent.ScopedRepos, repo) {
return EvalResult{
Decision: Deny,
Agent: agentName,
@ -247,6 +247,11 @@ func matchScope(pattern, repo string) bool {
return true
}
// Star means unrestricted access for all repos.
if pattern == "*" {
return true
}
// Check for wildcard patterns.
if !strings.Contains(pattern, "*") {
return false

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@ -270,34 +270,49 @@ func TestDefaultRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
// --- Phase 0 Additions ---
// TestEvaluate_Good_Tier2EmptyScopedReposAllowsAll verifies that a Tier 2
// agent with empty ScopedRepos is treated as "unrestricted" for repo-scoped
// capabilities. NOTE: This is a potential security concern documented in
// FINDINGS.md — empty ScopedRepos bypasses the repo scope check entirely.
func TestEvaluate_Good_Tier2EmptyScopedReposAllowsAll(t *testing.T) {
// TestEvaluate_Bad_Tier2EmptyScopedReposDeniesAll verifies that an empty
// scoped-repo list blocks repo-scoped capabilities by default.
func TestEvaluate_Bad_Tier2EmptyScopedReposDeniesAll(t *testing.T) {
r := NewRegistry()
require.NoError(t, r.Register(Agent{
Name: "Hypnos",
Tier: TierVerified,
ScopedRepos: []string{}, // empty — currently means "unrestricted"
ScopedRepos: []string{},
}))
pe := NewPolicyEngine(r)
// Current behaviour: empty ScopedRepos skips scope check (len == 0)
result := pe.Evaluate("Hypnos", CapPushRepo, "host-uk/core")
assert.Equal(t, Allow, result.Decision,
"empty ScopedRepos currently allows all repos (potential security finding)")
assert.Equal(t, Deny, result.Decision,
"empty ScopedRepos should deny repo-scoped operations by default")
result = pe.Evaluate("Hypnos", CapReadSecrets, "host-uk/core")
assert.Equal(t, Allow, result.Decision)
assert.Equal(t, Deny, result.Decision)
result = pe.Evaluate("Hypnos", CapCreatePR, "host-uk/core")
assert.Equal(t, Allow, result.Decision)
// Non-repo-scoped capabilities should still work
result = pe.Evaluate("Hypnos", CapCreateIssue, "")
assert.Equal(t, Allow, result.Decision)
result = pe.Evaluate("Hypnos", CapCommentIssue, "")
}
func TestEvaluate_Good_Tier2WildcardAllowsAll(t *testing.T) {
r := NewRegistry()
require.NoError(t, r.Register(Agent{
Name: "Hydrus",
Tier: TierVerified,
ScopedRepos: []string{"*"},
}))
pe := NewPolicyEngine(r)
result := pe.Evaluate("Hydrus", CapPushRepo, "host-uk/core")
assert.Equal(t, Allow, result.Decision)
result = pe.Evaluate("Hydrus", CapReadSecrets, "host-uk/any")
assert.Equal(t, Allow, result.Decision)
result = pe.Evaluate("Hydrus", CapCreateIssue, "")
assert.Equal(t, Allow, result.Decision)
result = pe.Evaluate("Hydrus", CapCommentIssue, "")
assert.Equal(t, Allow, result.Decision)
}

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@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ func TestMatchScope_Good_ExactMatch(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, matchScope("host-uk/core", "host-uk/core"))
}
func TestMatchScope_Good_StarWildcard(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, matchScope("*", "host-uk/core"))
assert.True(t, matchScope("*", "core/php/sub"))
}
func TestMatchScope_Good_SingleWildcard(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, matchScope("core/*", "core/php"))
assert.True(t, matchScope("core/*", "core/go-crypt"))

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@ -71,7 +71,9 @@ type Agent struct {
Name string
// Tier is the agent's trust level.
Tier Tier
// ScopedRepos limits repo access for Tier 2 agents. Empty means no repo access.
// ScopedRepos limits repo access for Tier 2 agents.
// Empty means no repo access.
// Use ["*"] for unrestricted repo scope.
// Tier 3 agents ignore this field (they have access to all repos).
ScopedRepos []string
// RateLimit is the maximum requests per minute. 0 means unlimited.