Implements Phase 4 of the go-p2p task queue. The Dispatcher routes HMAC-verified UEPS packets to registered IntentHandlers by IntentID, enforcing a threat circuit breaker that drops packets with ThreatScore exceeding 50,000 (logged as threat events at WARN level). Design choices: - IntentHandler is a func type (not interface) for lightweight registration - 1:1 mapping of IntentID to handler, replacement on re-register - Threat check fires before intent routing (hostile packets never reach handlers) - Sentinel errors (ErrThreatScoreExceeded, ErrUnknownIntent, ErrNilPacket) - RWMutex protects handler map for concurrent safety Tests: 10 test functions, 17 subtests — 100% dispatcher coverage. Race detector clean. All 102 existing tests continue to pass. Co-Authored-By: Charon <developers@lethean.io>
128 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
128 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
package node
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import (
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"fmt"
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"sync"
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"forge.lthn.ai/core/go-p2p/logging"
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"forge.lthn.ai/core/go-p2p/ueps"
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)
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// ThreatScoreThreshold is the maximum allowable threat score. Packets exceeding
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// this value are silently dropped by the circuit breaker and logged as threat
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// events. The threshold sits at ~76% of the uint16 range (50,000 / 65,535),
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// providing headroom for legitimate elevated-risk traffic whilst rejecting
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// clearly hostile payloads.
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const ThreatScoreThreshold uint16 = 50000
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// Well-known intent identifiers. These correspond to the semantic tokens
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// carried in the UEPS IntentID header field (RFC-021).
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const (
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IntentHandshake byte = 0x01 // Connection establishment / hello
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IntentCompute byte = 0x20 // Compute job request
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IntentRehab byte = 0x30 // Benevolent intervention (pause execution)
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IntentCustom byte = 0xFF // Extended / application-level sub-protocols
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)
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// IntentHandler processes a UEPS packet that has been routed by intent.
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// Implementations receive the fully parsed and HMAC-verified packet.
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type IntentHandler func(pkt *ueps.ParsedPacket) error
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// Dispatcher routes verified UEPS packets to registered intent handlers.
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// It enforces a threat circuit breaker before routing: any packet whose
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// ThreatScore exceeds ThreatScoreThreshold is dropped and logged.
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//
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// Design decisions:
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// - Handlers are registered per IntentID (1:1 mapping).
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// - Unknown intents are logged at WARN level and silently dropped (no error
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// returned to the caller) to avoid back-pressure on the transport layer.
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// - High-threat packets are dropped silently (logged at WARN) rather than
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// returning an error, consistent with the "don't even parse the payload"
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// philosophy from the original stub.
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// - The dispatcher is safe for concurrent use; a RWMutex protects the
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// handler map.
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type Dispatcher struct {
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handlers map[byte]IntentHandler
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mu sync.RWMutex
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log *logging.Logger
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}
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// NewDispatcher creates a Dispatcher with no registered handlers.
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func NewDispatcher() *Dispatcher {
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return &Dispatcher{
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handlers: make(map[byte]IntentHandler),
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log: logging.New(logging.Config{
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Level: logging.LevelDebug,
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Component: "dispatcher",
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}),
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}
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}
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// RegisterHandler associates an IntentHandler with a specific IntentID.
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// Calling RegisterHandler with an IntentID that already has a handler will
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// replace the previous handler.
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func (d *Dispatcher) RegisterHandler(intentID byte, handler IntentHandler) {
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d.mu.Lock()
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defer d.mu.Unlock()
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d.handlers[intentID] = handler
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d.log.Debug("handler registered", logging.Fields{
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"intent_id": fmt.Sprintf("0x%02X", intentID),
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})
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}
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// Dispatch routes a parsed UEPS packet through the threat circuit breaker
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// and then to the appropriate intent handler.
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//
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// Behaviour:
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// - Returns ErrThreatScoreExceeded if the packet's ThreatScore exceeds the
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// threshold (packet is dropped and logged).
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// - Returns ErrUnknownIntent if no handler is registered for the IntentID
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// (packet is dropped and logged).
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// - Returns nil on successful delivery to a handler, or any error the
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// handler itself returns.
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// - A nil packet returns ErrNilPacket immediately.
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func (d *Dispatcher) Dispatch(pkt *ueps.ParsedPacket) error {
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if pkt == nil {
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return ErrNilPacket
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}
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// 1. Threat circuit breaker (L5 guard)
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if pkt.Header.ThreatScore > ThreatScoreThreshold {
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d.log.Warn("packet dropped: threat score exceeds safety threshold", logging.Fields{
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"threat_score": pkt.Header.ThreatScore,
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"threshold": ThreatScoreThreshold,
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"intent_id": fmt.Sprintf("0x%02X", pkt.Header.IntentID),
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"version": pkt.Header.Version,
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})
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return ErrThreatScoreExceeded
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}
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// 2. Intent routing (L9 semantic)
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d.mu.RLock()
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handler, exists := d.handlers[pkt.Header.IntentID]
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d.mu.RUnlock()
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if !exists {
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d.log.Warn("packet dropped: unknown intent", logging.Fields{
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"intent_id": fmt.Sprintf("0x%02X", pkt.Header.IntentID),
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"version": pkt.Header.Version,
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})
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return ErrUnknownIntent
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}
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return handler(pkt)
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}
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// Sentinel errors returned by Dispatch.
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var (
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// ErrThreatScoreExceeded is returned when a packet's ThreatScore exceeds
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// the safety threshold.
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ErrThreatScoreExceeded = fmt.Errorf("packet rejected: threat score exceeds safety threshold (%d)", ThreatScoreThreshold)
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// ErrUnknownIntent is returned when no handler is registered for the
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// packet's IntentID.
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ErrUnknownIntent = fmt.Errorf("packet dropped: unknown intent")
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// ErrNilPacket is returned when a nil packet is passed to Dispatch.
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ErrNilPacket = fmt.Errorf("dispatch: nil packet")
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)
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