core-agent-ide/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md
viyatb-oai 0d1539e74c
fix(linux-sandbox): prefer system /usr/bin/bwrap when available (#14963)
## Problem
Ubuntu/AppArmor hosts started failing in the default Linux sandbox path
after the switch to vendored/default bubblewrap in `0.115.0`.

The clearest report is in
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), especially [this
investigation
comment](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919#issuecomment-4076504751):
on affected Ubuntu systems, `/usr/bin/bwrap` works, but a copied or
vendored `bwrap` binary fails with errors like `bwrap: setting up uid
map: Permission denied` or `bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR:
Operation not permitted`.

The root cause is Ubuntu's `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`
profile, which grants `userns` access specifically to `/usr/bin/bwrap`.
Once Codex started using a vendored/internal bubblewrap path, that path
was no longer covered by the distro AppArmor exception, so sandbox
namespace setup could fail even when user namespaces were otherwise
enabled and `uidmap` was installed.

## What this PR changes
- prefer system `/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it is available
- keep vendored bubblewrap as the fallback when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is
missing
- when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, surface a Codex startup warning
through the app-server/TUI warning path instead of printing directly
from the sandbox helper with `eprintln!`
- use the same launcher decision for both the main sandbox execution
path and the `/proc` preflight path
- document the updated Linux bubblewrap behavior in the Linux sandbox
and core READMEs

## Why this fix
This still fixes the Ubuntu/AppArmor regression from
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), but it keeps the
runtime rule simple and platform-agnostic: if the standard system
bubblewrap is installed, use it; otherwise fall back to the vendored
helper.

The warning now follows that same simple rule. If Codex cannot find
`/usr/bin/bwrap`, it tells the user that it is falling back to the
vendored helper, and it does so through the existing startup warning
plumbing that reaches the TUI and app-server instead of low-level
sandbox stderr.

## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server
tests::embedded_app_server_start_failure_is_returned`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-tui-app-server --all-targets`
2026-03-17 23:05:34 +00:00

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Markdown

# codex-linux-sandbox
This crate is responsible for producing:
- a `codex-linux-sandbox` standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
- a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as `run_main()` so that
- the `codex-exec` CLI can check if its arg0 is `codex-linux-sandbox` and, if so, execute as if it were `codex-linux-sandbox`
- this should also be true of the `codex` multitool CLI
On Linux, the bubblewrap pipeline prefers the system `/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever
it is available. If `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, the helper still falls back to
the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into this binary.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing so users
know it is falling back to the vendored helper.
**Current Behavior**
- Legacy `SandboxPolicy` / `sandbox_mode` configs remain supported.
- Bubblewrap is the default filesystem sandbox pipeline.
- If `/usr/bin/bwrap` is present, the helper uses it.
- If `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, the helper falls back to the vendored
bubblewrap path.
- If `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, Codex also surfaces a startup warning instead
of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
- Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as an explicit legacy
fallback path.
- Set `features.use_legacy_landlock = true` (or CLI `-c use_legacy_landlock=true`)
to force the legacy Landlock fallback.
- The legacy Landlock fallback is used only when the split filesystem policy is
sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after `cwd` resolution.
- Split-only filesystem policies that do not round-trip through the legacy
`SandboxPolicy` model stay on bubblewrap so nested read-only or denied
carveouts are preserved.
- When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, the helper applies `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` and a
seccomp network filter in-process.
- When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, the filesystem is read-only by default via `--ro-bind / /`.
- When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, writable roots are layered with `--bind <root> <root>`.
- When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, protected subpaths under writable roots (for
example `.git`,
resolved `gitdir:`, and `.codex`) are re-applied as read-only via `--ro-bind`.
- When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, overlapping split-policy
entries are applied in path-specificity order so narrower writable children
can reopen broader read-only or denied parents while narrower denied subpaths
still win. For example, `/repo = write`, `/repo/a = none`, `/repo/a/b = write`
keeps `/repo` writable, denies `/repo/a`, and reopens `/repo/a/b` as
writable again.
- When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside
writable roots are blocked by mounting `/dev/null` on the symlink or first
missing component.
- When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, the helper explicitly isolates the user namespace via
`--unshare-user` and the PID namespace via `--unshare-pid`.
- When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also
isolates the network namespace via `--unshare-net`.
- In managed proxy mode, the helper uses `--unshare-net` plus an internal
TCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxy
endpoints.
- In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new
AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.
- When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, it mounts a fresh `/proc` via `--proc /proc` by default, but
you can skip this in restrictive container environments with `--no-proc`.
**Notes**
- The CLI surface still uses legacy names like `codex debug landlock`.