core-agent-ide/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md
viyatb-oai b3202cbd58
feat(linux-sandbox): implement proxy-only egress via TCP-UDS-TCP bridge (#11293)
## Summary
- Implement Linux proxy-only routing in `codex-rs/linux-sandbox` with a
two-stage bridge: host namespace `loopback TCP proxy endpoint -> UDS`,
then bwrap netns `loopback TCP listener -> host UDS`.
- Add hidden `--proxy-route-spec` plumbing for outer-to-inner stage
handoff.
- Fail closed in proxy mode when no valid loopback proxy endpoints can
be routed.
- Introduce explicit network seccomp modes: `Restricted` (legacy
restricted networking) and `ProxyRouted` (allow INET/INET6 for routed
proxy access, deny `AF_UNIX` and `socketpair`).
- Enforce that proxy bridge/routing is bwrap-only by validating
`--apply-seccomp-then-exec` requires `--use-bwrap-sandbox`.
- Keep landlock-only flows unchanged (no proxy bridge behavior outside
bwrap).

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-21 18:16:34 +00:00

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# codex-linux-sandbox
This crate is responsible for producing:
- a `codex-linux-sandbox` standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
- a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as `run_main()` so that
- the `codex-exec` CLI can check if its arg0 is `codex-linux-sandbox` and, if so, execute as if it were `codex-linux-sandbox`
- this should also be true of the `codex` multitool CLI
On Linux, the bubblewrap pipeline uses the vendored bubblewrap path compiled
into this binary.
**Current Behavior**
- Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as the legacy pipeline.
- The bubblewrap pipeline is standardized on the vendored path.
- During rollout, the bubblewrap pipeline is gated by the temporary feature
flag `use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` (CLI `-c` alias for
`features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap`; legacy remains default when off).
- When enabled, the bubblewrap pipeline applies `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` and a
seccomp network filter in-process.
- When enabled, the filesystem is read-only by default via `--ro-bind / /`.
- When enabled, writable roots are layered with `--bind <root> <root>`.
- When enabled, protected subpaths under writable roots (for example `.git`,
resolved `gitdir:`, and `.codex`) are re-applied as read-only via `--ro-bind`.
- When enabled, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside
writable roots are blocked by mounting `/dev/null` on the symlink or first
missing component.
- When enabled, the helper isolates the PID namespace via `--unshare-pid`.
- When enabled and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also
isolates the network namespace via `--unshare-net`.
- In managed proxy mode, the helper uses `--unshare-net` plus an internal
TCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxy
endpoints.
- In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new
AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.
- When enabled, it mounts a fresh `/proc` via `--proc /proc` by default, but
you can skip this in restrictive container environments with `--no-proc`.
**Notes**
- The CLI surface still uses legacy names like `codex debug landlock`.