core-agent-ide/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md
viyatb-oai 3391e5ea86
feat(sandbox): enforce proxy-aware network routing in sandbox (#11113)
## Summary
- expand proxy env injection to cover common tool env vars
(`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`/`ALL_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY` families +
tool-specific variants)
- harden macOS Seatbelt network policy generation to route through
inferred loopback proxy endpoints and fail closed when proxy env is
malformed
- thread proxy-aware Linux sandbox flags and add minimal bwrap netns
isolation hook for restricted non-proxy runs
- add/refresh tests for proxy env wiring, Seatbelt policy generation,
and Linux sandbox argument wiring
2026-02-10 07:44:21 +00:00

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Markdown

# codex-linux-sandbox
This crate is responsible for producing:
- a `codex-linux-sandbox` standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
- a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as `run_main()` so that
- the `codex-exec` CLI can check if its arg0 is `codex-linux-sandbox` and, if so, execute as if it were `codex-linux-sandbox`
- this should also be true of the `codex` multitool CLI
On Linux, the bubblewrap pipeline uses the vendored bubblewrap path compiled
into this binary.
**Current Behavior**
- Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as the legacy pipeline.
- The bubblewrap pipeline is standardized on the vendored path.
- During rollout, the bubblewrap pipeline is gated by the temporary feature
flag `use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` (CLI `-c` alias for
`features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap`; legacy remains default when off).
- When enabled, the bubblewrap pipeline applies `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` and a
seccomp network filter in-process.
- When enabled, the filesystem is read-only by default via `--ro-bind / /`.
- When enabled, writable roots are layered with `--bind <root> <root>`.
- When enabled, protected subpaths under writable roots (for example `.git`,
resolved `gitdir:`, and `.codex`) are re-applied as read-only via `--ro-bind`.
- When enabled, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside
writable roots are blocked by mounting `/dev/null` on the symlink or first
missing component.
- When enabled, the helper isolates the PID namespace via `--unshare-pid`.
- When enabled and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also
isolates the network namespace via `--unshare-net`.
- When enabled, it mounts a fresh `/proc` via `--proc /proc` by default, but
you can skip this in restrictive container environments with `--no-proc`.
**Notes**
- The CLI surface still uses legacy names like `codex debug landlock`.