4.9 KiB
4.9 KiB
TODO.md — go-crypt
Dispatched from core/go orchestration. Pick up tasks in order.
Phase 0: Test Coverage & Hardening
- Expand auth/ tests — Added 8 new tests: concurrent session creation (10 goroutines), session token uniqueness (1000 tokens), challenge expiry boundary, empty password registration, very long username (10K chars), Unicode username/password, air-gapped round-trip, refresh already-expired session. All pass with
-race. - Expand crypt/ tests — Added 12 new tests: wrong passphrase decrypt (ChaCha20+AES), empty plaintext round-trip (ChaCha20+AES), 1MB payload round-trip (ChaCha20+AES), ciphertext-too-short rejection, key derivation determinism (Argon2id+scrypt), HKDF different info strings, HKDF nil salt, checksum of empty file (SHA-256+SHA-512), checksum of non-existent file, checksum consistency with SHA256Sum. Note: large payload test uses 1MB (not 10MB) to keep tests fast.
- Expand trust/ tests — Added 9 new tests: concurrent Register/Get/Remove (10 goroutines, race-safe), Tier 0 rejection, negative tier rejection, token expiry boundary, zero-value token expiry, concurrent List during mutations, empty ScopedRepos behaviour (documented as finding F3), capability not in any list, concurrent Evaluate.
- Security audit — Full audit documented in FINDINGS.md. 4 findings: F1 (LTHN used for passwords, medium), F2 (PGP keys not zeroed, low), F3 (empty ScopedRepos bypasses scope, medium), F4 (go vet clean). No
math/randusage. All nonces usecrypto/rand. No secrets in error messages. go vet ./...clean — No warnings.- Benchmark suite — Created
crypt/bench_test.go(7 benchmarks: Argon2Derive, ChaCha20 1KB/1MB, AESGCM 1KB/1MB, HMACSHA256 1KB, VerifyHMACSHA256) andtrust/bench_test.go(3 benchmarks: PolicyEvaluate 100 agents, RegistryGet, RegistryRegister).
Phase 1: Session Persistence
- Session storage interface — Extracted in-memory session map into
SessionStoreinterface withGet,Set,Delete,DeleteByUser,Cleanupmethods.MemorySessionStorewraps the original map+mutex pattern.ErrSessionNotFoundsentinel error. - SQLite session store —
SQLiteSessionStorebacked by go-store (SQLite KV). Sessions stored as JSON in"sessions"group. Mutex-serialised for SQLite single-writer safety. - Background cleanup —
StartCleanup(ctx, interval)goroutine purges expired sessions periodically. Stops on context cancellation. - Session migration — Backward-compatible:
MemorySessionStoreis default,WithSessionStore(store)option for persistent store. All existing tests updated and passing. Commit1aeabfd.
Phase 2: Key Management
Step 2.1: Password hash migration (addresses Finding F1)
- Migrate Login() from LTHN to Argon2id — Register uses
crypt.HashPassword()(Argon2id), writes.hashfile. Login detects format: tries.hash(Argon2id) first, falls back to.lthn(LTHN). Successful legacy login transparently re-hashes with Argon2id. SharedverifyPassword()helper handles dual-path logic. 5 tests: RegisterArgon2id_Good, LoginArgon2id_Good, LoginArgon2id_Bad, LegacyLTHNMigration_Good, LegacyLTHNLogin_Bad.
Step 2.2: Key rotation
- RotateKeyPair — Full flow: load private key → decrypt metadata with old password → generate new PGP keypair → re-encrypt metadata → update .pub/.key/.json/.hash → invalidate sessions. 4 tests: RotateKeyPair_Good, RotateKeyPair_Bad (wrong password), RotateKeyPair_Ugly (non-existent user), RotateKeyPair_OldKeyCannotDecrypt_Good.
Step 2.3: Key revocation
- RevokeKey + IsRevoked — Option B chosen: JSON
Revocation{UserID, Reason, RevokedAt}record in.revfile.IsRevoked()parses JSON, ignores legacy"REVOCATION_PLACEHOLDER". Login and CreateChallenge reject revoked users. 6 tests including legacy user revocation.
Step 2.4: Hardware key interface (contract only)
- HardwareKey interface —
hardware.go: Sign, Decrypt, GetPublicKey, IsAvailable methods.WithHardwareKey()option on Authenticator. Contract-only, no concrete implementations yet. Integration points documented in auth.go.
All Phase 2: commit 301eac1. 55 tests total, all pass with -race.
Phase 3: Trust Policy Extensions
- Approval workflow — Implement the approval flow that
NeedsApprovaldecisions point to. Queue-based: agent requests approval → admin reviews → approve/deny. - Audit log — Record all policy evaluations (agent, capability, decision, timestamp). Append-only log for compliance.
- Dynamic policies — Load policies from YAML/JSON config. Currently hardcoded in
DefaultPolicies(). - Scope wildcards — Support
core/*scope patterns in ScopedRepos, not just exact strings.
Workflow
- Virgil in core/go writes tasks here after research
- This repo's dedicated session picks up tasks in phase order
- Mark
[x]when done, note commit hash