google-labs-jules[bot] 73795785e9 docs: add cryptographic implementation audit

This commit adds a cryptographic audit report in AUDIT-CRYPTO.md.

The audit was conducted to review the cryptographic implementations in the codebase. The findings indicate that there are no custom or third-party cryptographic implementations present. The use of `math/rand` is confined to non-security-critical test code, and references to `TLSA` in DNS-related files are purely descriptive.

Co-authored-by: Snider <631881+Snider@users.noreply.github.com>

2026-02-02 01:17:35 +00:00

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Cryptographic Implementation Audit: Poindexter

Date: 2024-07-25

1. Executive Summary

A thorough audit of the Poindexter codebase was conducted to review its cryptographic implementations. The audit found no instances of custom or third-party cryptographic code. The project, in its current state, does not handle sensitive data requiring encryption, hashing, or secure random number generation.

Based on this analysis, the codebase is considered out of scope for a detailed cryptographic security review.

2. Audit Scope

The audit focused on the following areas as per the initial request:

Constant-time operations: Searching for code where timing side-channels could leak sensitive information.
Key material handling: Looking for storage, transmission, or use of cryptographic keys.
Random number generation: Identifying the use of cryptographically secure (CSPRNG) vs. insecure random number generators.
Algorithm implementation correctness: Verifying the implementation details of any cryptographic algorithms found.
Side-channel resistance: General review for potential information leaks.

3. Findings

Our review of the entire Go codebase yielded the following observations:

3.1. No Cryptographic Implementations Found

The primary finding is that the Poindexter library does not contain any cryptographic functions. Its purpose is to provide sorting utilities and a k-d tree implementation, which do not inherently require cryptography.

3.2. Use of `math/rand`

The codebase makes use of the math/rand package in several test files:

kdtree_backend_parity_test.go
fuzz_kdtree_test.go
bench_kdtree_dual_test.go

This usage is confined to generating random data for testing and benchmarking purposes (e.g., creating random points for the k-d tree). Since this data is not security-sensitive, the use of a non-cryptographically secure random number generator like math/rand is appropriate and poses no security risk.

3.3. DNS-related Mentions (`TLSA`)

The file dns_tools.go and its corresponding test file contain references to TLSA (TLS Authentication) DNS records. These references are limited to type definitions and descriptive strings. The codebase does not implement any part of the DANE protocol or the underlying cryptographic operations associated with TLSA records.

4. Recommendations

Continue Using Standard Libraries: If cryptographic functionality is required in the future (e.g., for securing communications or data), it is strongly recommended to use Go's standard crypto library or other well-vetted, community-trusted cryptographic libraries.
Avoid Custom Implementations: Do not implement custom cryptographic algorithms, as this is notoriously error-prone and can lead to severe security vulnerabilities.

5. Conclusion

The Poindexter library currently has no exposure to cryptographic implementation risks because it does not implement any cryptographic features. The existing code follows good practices by using non-secure random number generation only for non-security-critical applications. No corrective actions are required at this time.

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