73795785e9
This commit adds a cryptographic audit report in AUDIT-CRYPTO.md. The audit was conducted to review the cryptographic implementations in the codebase. The findings indicate that there are no custom or third-party cryptographic implementations present. The use of `math/rand` is confined to non-security-critical test code, and references to `TLSA` in DNS-related files are purely descriptive. Co-authored-by: Snider <631881+Snider@users.noreply.github.com>
50 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
50 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
# Cryptographic Implementation Audit: Poindexter
|
|
|
|
**Date:** 2024-07-25
|
|
|
|
## 1. Executive Summary
|
|
|
|
A thorough audit of the Poindexter codebase was conducted to review its cryptographic implementations. The audit found **no instances of custom or third-party cryptographic code**. The project, in its current state, does not handle sensitive data requiring encryption, hashing, or secure random number generation.
|
|
|
|
Based on this analysis, the codebase is considered **out of scope** for a detailed cryptographic security review.
|
|
|
|
## 2. Audit Scope
|
|
|
|
The audit focused on the following areas as per the initial request:
|
|
|
|
- **Constant-time operations:** Searching for code where timing side-channels could leak sensitive information.
|
|
- **Key material handling:** Looking for storage, transmission, or use of cryptographic keys.
|
|
- **Random number generation:** Identifying the use of cryptographically secure (CSPRNG) vs. insecure random number generators.
|
|
- **Algorithm implementation correctness:** Verifying the implementation details of any cryptographic algorithms found.
|
|
- **Side-channel resistance:** General review for potential information leaks.
|
|
|
|
## 3. Findings
|
|
|
|
Our review of the entire Go codebase yielded the following observations:
|
|
|
|
### 3.1. No Cryptographic Implementations Found
|
|
|
|
The primary finding is that the Poindexter library does not contain any cryptographic functions. Its purpose is to provide sorting utilities and a k-d tree implementation, which do not inherently require cryptography.
|
|
|
|
### 3.2. Use of `math/rand`
|
|
|
|
The codebase makes use of the `math/rand` package in several test files:
|
|
|
|
- `kdtree_backend_parity_test.go`
|
|
- `fuzz_kdtree_test.go`
|
|
- `bench_kdtree_dual_test.go`
|
|
|
|
This usage is confined to generating random data for testing and benchmarking purposes (e.g., creating random points for the k-d tree). Since this data is not security-sensitive, the use of a non-cryptographically secure random number generator like `math/rand` is appropriate and poses no security risk.
|
|
|
|
### 3.3. DNS-related Mentions (`TLSA`)
|
|
|
|
The file `dns_tools.go` and its corresponding test file contain references to `TLSA` (TLS Authentication) DNS records. These references are limited to type definitions and descriptive strings. The codebase **does not implement** any part of the DANE protocol or the underlying cryptographic operations associated with TLSA records.
|
|
|
|
## 4. Recommendations
|
|
|
|
- **Continue Using Standard Libraries:** If cryptographic functionality is required in the future (e.g., for securing communications or data), it is strongly recommended to use Go's standard `crypto` library or other well-vetted, community-trusted cryptographic libraries.
|
|
- **Avoid Custom Implementations:** Do not implement custom cryptographic algorithms, as this is notoriously error-prone and can lead to severe security vulnerabilities.
|
|
|
|
## 5. Conclusion
|
|
|
|
The Poindexter library currently has no exposure to cryptographic implementation risks because it does not implement any cryptographic features. The existing code follows good practices by using non-secure random number generation only for non-security-critical applications. No corrective actions are required at this time.
|